Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, i-Perception, 6 (5), 2015, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the i-Perception page: http://ipe.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The relative nature of perception
T2 - a response to Canal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015)
AU - Linkenauger, Sally
N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, i-Perception, 6 (5), 2015, © SAGE Publications Ltd, 2015 by SAGE Publications Ltd at the i-Perception page: http://ipe.sagepub.com/ on SAGE Journals Online: http://online.sagepub.com/
PY - 2015/10
Y1 - 2015/10
N2 - Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013)’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Thirdly, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues.
AB - Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) present an argument about the incommensurate relationship between affordance perception and spatial perception in a criticism of Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013)’s phenotypic approach to perception. Many of their criticisms are based on a difference in the interpretation of the core ideas underlying the phenotypic approach. The most important of these differences in interpretations concern fundamental assumptions about the nature of the perceptions of size and distance themselves. Extent perception must be relative to the organism; therefore, there can be no veridical perception of space. Also, we argue in the phenotypic approach that space perception is an emergent property of affordance perception; they are not different types of perceptions as Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp presume. Thirdly, affordance perception need not be perfectly accurate, just good enough. Additionally, affordance perception need not be dichotomous; this presumption likely originates in the methodology typically employed to study affordance perception. Finally, I agree with Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp that joint research efforts will clarify and improve our understanding of these issues.
KW - visual perception
KW - affordance
KW - ecological
KW - distance perception
KW - size perception
U2 - 10.1177/2041669515599898
DO - 10.1177/2041669515599898
M3 - Journal article
VL - 6
JO - i-Perception
JF - i-Perception
SN - 2041-6695
IS - 5
ER -