In this paper I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claims face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllisterâ��s â��aesthetic inductionâ�� model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic at all but are in fact â��maskedâ�� epistemic assessments.
The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22 (1), 2008, © Informa Plc