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Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all.

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Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all. / Todd, Cain S.
In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 22, No. 1, 03.2008, p. 61-79.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Todd CS. Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2008 Mar;22(1):61-79. doi: 10.1080/02698590802280910

Author

Todd, Cain S. / Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all. In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2008 ; Vol. 22, No. 1. pp. 61-79.

Bibtex

@article{ccd52222fbb64c83a18b1acc03fe58ad,
title = "Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all.",
abstract = "In this paper I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claims face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllister{\^a}��s {\^a}��aesthetic induction{\^a}�� model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic at all but are in fact {\^a}��masked{\^a}�� epistemic assessments.",
keywords = "aesthetic judgement, science, mathematics, truth, beauty",
author = "Todd, {Cain S.}",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22 (1), 2008, {\textcopyright} Informa Plc",
year = "2008",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1080/02698590802280910",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "61--79",
journal = "International Studies in the Philosophy of Science",
issn = "0269-8595",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Unmasking the truth beneath the beauty : why the supposed aesthetic judgements made in science may not be aesthetic at all.

AU - Todd, Cain S.

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 22 (1), 2008, © Informa Plc

PY - 2008/3

Y1 - 2008/3

N2 - In this paper I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claims face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllister�s �aesthetic induction� model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic at all but are in fact �masked� epistemic assessments.

AB - In this paper I examine the status of putative aesthetic judgements in science and mathematics. I argue that if the judgements at issue are taken to be genuinely aesthetic they can be divided into two types, positing either a disjunction or connection between aesthetic and epistemic criteria in theory/proof assessment. I show that both types of claims face serious difficulties in explaining the purported role of aesthetic judgements in these areas. I claim that the best current explanation of this role, McAllister�s �aesthetic induction� model, fails to demonstrate that the judgements at issue are genuinely aesthetic. I argue that, in light of these considerations, there are strong reasons for suspecting that many, and perhaps all, of the supposedly aesthetic claims are not genuinely aesthetic at all but are in fact �masked� epistemic assessments.

KW - aesthetic judgement

KW - science

KW - mathematics

KW - truth

KW - beauty

U2 - 10.1080/02698590802280910

DO - 10.1080/02698590802280910

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 61

EP - 79

JO - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

JF - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

SN - 0269-8595

IS - 1

ER -