Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchrono...

Research

Associated organisational unit

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Published

Standard

A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation. / Friedberg, Ivo; Laverty, David M.; McLaughlin, Kieran et al.
Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015). 2015. p. 52-62 (Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review

Harvard

Friedberg, I, Laverty, DM, McLaughlin, K & Smith, P 2015, A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation. in Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015). Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC), pp. 52-62. https://doi.org/10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6

APA

Friedberg, I., Laverty, D. M., McLaughlin, K., & Smith, P. (2015). A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015) (pp. 52-62). (Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)). https://doi.org/10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6

Vancouver

Friedberg I, Laverty DM, McLaughlin K, Smith P. A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015). 2015. p. 52-62. (Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)). doi: 10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6

Author

Friedberg, Ivo ; Laverty, David M. ; McLaughlin, Kieran et al. / A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation. Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015). 2015. pp. 52-62 (Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{44399830e7334cdf8f6b2b35694d57d5,
title = "A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation",
abstract = "Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.",
author = "Ivo Friedberg and Laverty, {David M.} and Kieran McLaughlin and Paul Smith",
year = "2015",
month = sep,
day = "17",
doi = "10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6",
language = "English",
series = "Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)",
publisher = "BCS",
pages = "52--62",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015)",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - A Cyber-Physical Security Analysis of Synchronous-Islanded Microgrid Operation

AU - Friedberg, Ivo

AU - Laverty, David M.

AU - McLaughlin, Kieran

AU - Smith, Paul

PY - 2015/9/17

Y1 - 2015/9/17

N2 - Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.

AB - Cyber-security research in the field of smart grids is often performed with a focus on either the power and control domain or the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) domain. The characteristics of the power equipment or ICT domain are commonly not collectively considered. This work provides an analysis of the physical effects of cyber-attacks on microgrids – a smart grid construct that allows continued power supply when disconnected from a main grid. Different types of microgrid operations are explained (connected, islanded and synchronous-islanding) and potential cyber-attacks and their physical effects are analyzed. A testbed that is based on physical power and ICT equipment is presented to validate the results in both the physical and ICT domain.

U2 - 10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6

DO - 10.14236/ewic/ICS2015.6

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

T3 - Electronic Workshops in Computing (eWiC)

SP - 52

EP - 62

BT - Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2015 (ICS-CSR 2015)

ER -