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A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

Research output: Working paper

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A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement. / Bracco, Emanuele.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bracco, E 2017 'A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Bracco, E. (2017). A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bracco E. A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2017 Dec. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Bracco, Emanuele. / A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{a4c4eae5eaac45069d4ce07af7587e54,
title = "A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement",
abstract = "With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayorsissue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections. ",
keywords = "Political Budget Cycle, parking tickets, tax collection",
author = "Emanuele Bracco",
year = "2017",
month = dec,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

AU - Bracco, Emanuele

PY - 2017/12

Y1 - 2017/12

N2 - With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayorsissue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.

AB - With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayorsissue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.

KW - Political Budget Cycle

KW - parking tickets

KW - tax collection

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -