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A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. / Balkenborg, D.; Winter, E.
In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 27, No. 3, 04.1997, p. 325-345.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Balkenborg, D & Winter, E 1997, 'A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 325-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

APA

Balkenborg, D., & Winter, E. (1997). A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 27(3), 325-345. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

Vancouver

Balkenborg D, Winter E. A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1997 Apr;27(3):325-345. doi: 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

Author

Balkenborg, D. ; Winter, E. / A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. 1997 ; Vol. 27, No. 3. pp. 325-345.

Bibtex

@article{e93bbe56f3284b1b8dd543fbdd265cd0,
title = "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction",
abstract = "In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.",
keywords = "Backward induction, Common knowledge, Extensive games, Subgame perfection",
author = "D. Balkenborg and E. Winter",
year = "1997",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "325--345",
journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",
issn = "0304-4068",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

AU - Balkenborg, D.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 1997/4

Y1 - 1997/4

N2 - In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

AB - In an epistemic framework due to Aumann we characterize the condition on the rationality of the players that is both necessary and sufficient to imply backward induction in perfect information games in agent form. This condition requires each player to know that the players are rational at later, but not at previous, decision nodes.

KW - Backward induction

KW - Common knowledge

KW - Extensive games

KW - Subgame perfection

U2 - 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

DO - 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 325

EP - 345

JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics

JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics

SN - 0304-4068

IS - 3

ER -