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  • Par-2023-06-26-c

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A test of loyalty

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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A test of loyalty. / Foucart, Renaud; Tan, Jonathan H.W.
In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 97, No. 1, 31.08.2024, p. 109-137.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Foucart, R & Tan, JHW 2024, 'A test of loyalty', Theory and Decision, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 109-137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4

APA

Foucart, R., & Tan, J. H. W. (2024). A test of loyalty. Theory and Decision, 97(1), 109-137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4

Vancouver

Foucart R, Tan JHW. A test of loyalty. Theory and Decision. 2024 Aug 31;97(1):109-137. Epub 2023 Dec 31. doi: 10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4

Author

Foucart, Renaud ; Tan, Jonathan H.W. / A test of loyalty. In: Theory and Decision. 2024 ; Vol. 97, No. 1. pp. 109-137.

Bibtex

@article{4527d929eedb4b3cb26211fd3c8ebccb,
title = "A test of loyalty",
abstract = "We propose and test a model of loyalty in games. Players can mutually maintain loyalty by working towards a common goal that is pareto-superior to any Nash equilibrium without it. Loyalty imposes a psychological cost on defecting in an ongoing cooperation, which is thus sustained. We distinguish loyalty from reciprocity and explain how it complements guilt aversion with two dynamic games from a field experiment conducted in a Pakistani factory. The evidence supports the validity of loyalty, which has a stronger effect within than between groups.",
keywords = "Cooperation, Field experiment, Loyalty, Reciprocity, Trust",
author = "Renaud Foucart and Tan, {Jonathan H.W.}",
year = "2024",
month = aug,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4",
language = "English",
volume = "97",
pages = "109--137",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A test of loyalty

AU - Foucart, Renaud

AU - Tan, Jonathan H.W.

PY - 2024/8/31

Y1 - 2024/8/31

N2 - We propose and test a model of loyalty in games. Players can mutually maintain loyalty by working towards a common goal that is pareto-superior to any Nash equilibrium without it. Loyalty imposes a psychological cost on defecting in an ongoing cooperation, which is thus sustained. We distinguish loyalty from reciprocity and explain how it complements guilt aversion with two dynamic games from a field experiment conducted in a Pakistani factory. The evidence supports the validity of loyalty, which has a stronger effect within than between groups.

AB - We propose and test a model of loyalty in games. Players can mutually maintain loyalty by working towards a common goal that is pareto-superior to any Nash equilibrium without it. Loyalty imposes a psychological cost on defecting in an ongoing cooperation, which is thus sustained. We distinguish loyalty from reciprocity and explain how it complements guilt aversion with two dynamic games from a field experiment conducted in a Pakistani factory. The evidence supports the validity of loyalty, which has a stronger effect within than between groups.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Field experiment

KW - Loyalty

KW - Reciprocity

KW - Trust

U2 - 10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4

DO - 10.1007/s11238-023-09966-4

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85180894013

VL - 97

SP - 109

EP - 137

JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

SN - 0040-5833

IS - 1

ER -