Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation. / Seidmann, D.J.; Winter, E.
In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 65, No. 4, 01.10.1998, p. 793-815.Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation
AU - Seidmann, D.J.
AU - Winter, E.
PY - 1998/10/1
Y1 - 1998/10/1
N2 - We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions.
AB - We study noncooperative multilateral bargaining games, based on underlying TU games, in which coalitions can renegotiate their agreements. We distinguish between models in which players continue to bargain after implementing agreements ("reversible actions") and models in which players who implement agreements must leave the game ("irreversible actions"). We show that renegotiation always results in formation of the grand coalition if actions are reversible, but that the process may otherwise end with smaller coalitions. On the other hand, we show that the grand coalition cannot form in one step if the core of the game is empty, irrespective of the reversibility of actions.
U2 - 10.1111/1467-937X.00069
DO - 10.1111/1467-937X.00069
M3 - Journal article
VL - 65
SP - 793
EP - 815
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
SN - 0034-6527
IS - 4
ER -