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ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems

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ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems. / Wei, Ran; Foster, Simon; Mei, Haitao et al.
In: Journal of Systems and Software, Vol. 213, 112034, 01.07.2024.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Wei, R, Foster, S, Mei, H, Yan, F, Yang, R, Habli, I, O’Halloran, C, Tudor, N, Kelly, T & Nemouchi, Y 2024, 'ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems', Journal of Systems and Software, vol. 213, 112034. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034

APA

Wei, R., Foster, S., Mei, H., Yan, F., Yang, R., Habli, I., O’Halloran, C., Tudor, N., Kelly, T., & Nemouchi, Y. (2024). ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems. Journal of Systems and Software, 213, Article 112034. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034

Vancouver

Wei R, Foster S, Mei H, Yan F, Yang R, Habli I et al. ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems. Journal of Systems and Software. 2024 Jul 1;213:112034. Epub 2024 Apr 17. doi: 10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034

Author

Wei, Ran ; Foster, Simon ; Mei, Haitao et al. / ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems. In: Journal of Systems and Software. 2024 ; Vol. 213.

Bibtex

@article{326dd36b8e6247b585014081bbd41cb6,
title = "ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems",
abstract = "Assurance cases are used to communicate and assess confidence in critical system properties such as safety and security. Historically, assurance cases have been manually created documents, which are evaluated by system stakeholders through lengthy and complicated processes. In recent years, model-based system assurance approaches have gained popularity to improve the efficiency and quality of system assurance activities. This becomes increasingly important, as systems becomes more complex, it is a challenge to manage their development life-cycles, including coordination of development, verification and validation activities, and change impact analysis in inter-connected system assurance artifacts. Moreover, there is a need for assurance cases that support evolution during the operational life of the system, to enable continuous assurance in the face of an uncertain environment, as Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) are adopted into society. In this paper, we contribute ACCESS — Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems, an engineering methodology, together with its tool support, for the development of safety–critical systems around evolving model-based assurance cases. We show how model-based system assurance cases can trace to heterogeneous engineering artifacts (e.g. system architectural models, system safety analysis, system behaviour models, etc.), and how formal methods can be integrated during the development process. We demonstrate how assurance cases can be automatically evaluated both at development and runtime. We apply our approach to a case study based on an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV).",
author = "Ran Wei and Simon Foster and Haitao Mei and Fang Yan and Ruizhe Yang and Ibrahim Habli and Colin O{\textquoteright}Halloran and Nick Tudor and Tim Kelly and Yakoub Nemouchi",
year = "2024",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034",
language = "English",
volume = "213",
journal = "Journal of Systems and Software",
issn = "0164-1212",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - ACCESS: Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems

AU - Wei, Ran

AU - Foster, Simon

AU - Mei, Haitao

AU - Yan, Fang

AU - Yang, Ruizhe

AU - Habli, Ibrahim

AU - O’Halloran, Colin

AU - Tudor, Nick

AU - Kelly, Tim

AU - Nemouchi, Yakoub

PY - 2024/7/1

Y1 - 2024/7/1

N2 - Assurance cases are used to communicate and assess confidence in critical system properties such as safety and security. Historically, assurance cases have been manually created documents, which are evaluated by system stakeholders through lengthy and complicated processes. In recent years, model-based system assurance approaches have gained popularity to improve the efficiency and quality of system assurance activities. This becomes increasingly important, as systems becomes more complex, it is a challenge to manage their development life-cycles, including coordination of development, verification and validation activities, and change impact analysis in inter-connected system assurance artifacts. Moreover, there is a need for assurance cases that support evolution during the operational life of the system, to enable continuous assurance in the face of an uncertain environment, as Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) are adopted into society. In this paper, we contribute ACCESS — Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems, an engineering methodology, together with its tool support, for the development of safety–critical systems around evolving model-based assurance cases. We show how model-based system assurance cases can trace to heterogeneous engineering artifacts (e.g. system architectural models, system safety analysis, system behaviour models, etc.), and how formal methods can be integrated during the development process. We demonstrate how assurance cases can be automatically evaluated both at development and runtime. We apply our approach to a case study based on an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV).

AB - Assurance cases are used to communicate and assess confidence in critical system properties such as safety and security. Historically, assurance cases have been manually created documents, which are evaluated by system stakeholders through lengthy and complicated processes. In recent years, model-based system assurance approaches have gained popularity to improve the efficiency and quality of system assurance activities. This becomes increasingly important, as systems becomes more complex, it is a challenge to manage their development life-cycles, including coordination of development, verification and validation activities, and change impact analysis in inter-connected system assurance artifacts. Moreover, there is a need for assurance cases that support evolution during the operational life of the system, to enable continuous assurance in the face of an uncertain environment, as Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) are adopted into society. In this paper, we contribute ACCESS — Assurance Case Centric Engineering of Safety–critical Systems, an engineering methodology, together with its tool support, for the development of safety–critical systems around evolving model-based assurance cases. We show how model-based system assurance cases can trace to heterogeneous engineering artifacts (e.g. system architectural models, system safety analysis, system behaviour models, etc.), and how formal methods can be integrated during the development process. We demonstrate how assurance cases can be automatically evaluated both at development and runtime. We apply our approach to a case study based on an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV).

U2 - 10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034

DO - 10.1016/j.jss.2024.112034

M3 - Journal article

VL - 213

JO - Journal of Systems and Software

JF - Journal of Systems and Software

SN - 0164-1212

M1 - 112034

ER -