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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Accounting choice in measurement and comparability
T2 - an examination of the effect of the fair value option
AU - Guedes Cardoso Fontes, Joana
AU - Panaretou, Argyro
AU - Shakespeare, Catherine
PY - 2025/2/17
Y1 - 2025/2/17
N2 - The choice between historical cost and fair value measurement is one of the most debated issues among accounting academics and practitioners. We use the election of the fair value option (FVO) to study the effects of entities’ measurement choices on accounting comparability. The FVO enables entities to use different measurement bases for similar assets and liabilities, raising questions about whether the FVO compromises or enhances comparability. Using a sample of US banks, we find that FVO elections increase comparability both across FVO electing banks and between FVO electing banks and banks that never elect the FVO but only if the FVO elections comply with the intent of the standard setters to remedy accounting mismatches. Overall our results suggest that banks elect the FVO to better present their economics, yielding higher comparability.
AB - The choice between historical cost and fair value measurement is one of the most debated issues among accounting academics and practitioners. We use the election of the fair value option (FVO) to study the effects of entities’ measurement choices on accounting comparability. The FVO enables entities to use different measurement bases for similar assets and liabilities, raising questions about whether the FVO compromises or enhances comparability. Using a sample of US banks, we find that FVO elections increase comparability both across FVO electing banks and between FVO electing banks and banks that never elect the FVO but only if the FVO elections comply with the intent of the standard setters to remedy accounting mismatches. Overall our results suggest that banks elect the FVO to better present their economics, yielding higher comparability.
U2 - 10.1007/s11142-025-09869-5
DO - 10.1007/s11142-025-09869-5
M3 - Journal article
JO - Review of Accounting Studies
JF - Review of Accounting Studies
SN - 1380-6653
ER -