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An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm. / Chua, Jess H.; Chrisman, James J.; Bergiel, Erich B.
In: Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 33, No. 2, 03.2009, p. 355-372.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Chua, JH, Chrisman, JJ & Bergiel, EB 2009, 'An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm', Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 355-372. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x

APA

Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(2), 355-372. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x

Vancouver

Chua JH, Chrisman JJ, Bergiel EB. An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 2009 Mar;33(2):355-372. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x

Author

Chua, Jess H. ; Chrisman, James J. ; Bergiel, Erich B. / An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm. In: Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 2009 ; Vol. 33, No. 2. pp. 355-372.

Bibtex

@article{22e25c7cf8114f3b835df7d6f07def1b,
title = "An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm",
abstract = "The professionalized firm must evaluate the performance of managers and provide incentives that will motivate them to achieve the firm's goals. Using the agency theoretic framework we develop propositions on how differences in goals, altruistic tendencies, and strategic time horizons might affect performance evaluation and incentive compensation in family firms that employ both family and nonfamily managers and how these differences would affect the performance of the professionalized family firms relative to that of nonfamily firms.",
author = "Chua, {Jess H.} and Chrisman, {James J.} and Bergiel, {Erich B.}",
year = "2009",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x",
language = "English",
volume = "33",
pages = "355--372",
journal = "Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice",
issn = "1042-2587",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm

AU - Chua, Jess H.

AU - Chrisman, James J.

AU - Bergiel, Erich B.

PY - 2009/3

Y1 - 2009/3

N2 - The professionalized firm must evaluate the performance of managers and provide incentives that will motivate them to achieve the firm's goals. Using the agency theoretic framework we develop propositions on how differences in goals, altruistic tendencies, and strategic time horizons might affect performance evaluation and incentive compensation in family firms that employ both family and nonfamily managers and how these differences would affect the performance of the professionalized family firms relative to that of nonfamily firms.

AB - The professionalized firm must evaluate the performance of managers and provide incentives that will motivate them to achieve the firm's goals. Using the agency theoretic framework we develop propositions on how differences in goals, altruistic tendencies, and strategic time horizons might affect performance evaluation and incentive compensation in family firms that employ both family and nonfamily managers and how these differences would affect the performance of the professionalized family firms relative to that of nonfamily firms.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 33

SP - 355

EP - 372

JO - Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

JF - Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

SN - 1042-2587

IS - 2

ER -