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An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms

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An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms. / Chrisman, James J.; Chua, Jess H.; Steier, Lloyd P. et al.
In: Journal of Family Business Strategy, Vol. 3, No. 4, 12.2012, p. 197-206.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Chrisman, JJ, Chua, JH, Steier, LP, Wright, M & Mckee, DN 2012, 'An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms', Journal of Family Business Strategy, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 197-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003

APA

Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Steier, L. P., Wright, M., & Mckee, D. N. (2012). An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 3(4), 197-206. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003

Vancouver

Chrisman JJ, Chua JH, Steier LP, Wright M, Mckee DN. An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms. Journal of Family Business Strategy. 2012 Dec;3(4):197-206. doi: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003

Author

Chrisman, James J. ; Chua, Jess H. ; Steier, Lloyd P. et al. / An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms. In: Journal of Family Business Strategy. 2012 ; Vol. 3, No. 4. pp. 197-206.

Bibtex

@article{088eead7529140c8bc08d851abbc44b9,
title = "An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms",
abstract = "Family firms without able and willing family successors are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce owner–manager agency costs. In this article we examine the agency costs of MBOs that acquire family firms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double agency problem, and the relationship between the cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO.",
author = "Chrisman, {James J.} and Chua, {Jess H.} and Steier, {Lloyd P.} and Mike Wright and Mckee, {D{\textquoteright}lisa N.}",
year = "2012",
month = dec,
doi = "10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "197--206",
journal = "Journal of Family Business Strategy",
issn = "1877-8585",
publisher = "Elsevier Limited",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An agency theoretic analysis of value creation through management buy-outs of family firms

AU - Chrisman, James J.

AU - Chua, Jess H.

AU - Steier, Lloyd P.

AU - Wright, Mike

AU - Mckee, D’lisa N.

PY - 2012/12

Y1 - 2012/12

N2 - Family firms without able and willing family successors are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce owner–manager agency costs. In this article we examine the agency costs of MBOs that acquire family firms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double agency problem, and the relationship between the cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO.

AB - Family firms without able and willing family successors are frequently sold to non-family managers through management buy-outs (MBOs). Whether MBOs create value is thought to be dependent upon the ability to reduce owner–manager agency costs. In this article we examine the agency costs of MBOs that acquire family firms. We contribute to theory by arguing that in such situations, value creation by reducing agency costs will depend upon pre-MBO agency costs, the ability to solve the double agency problem, and the relationship between the cost of agency control mechanisms and the residual losses from opportunism before and after the MBO.

U2 - 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003

DO - 10.1016/j.jfbs.2012.10.003

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

SP - 197

EP - 206

JO - Journal of Family Business Strategy

JF - Journal of Family Business Strategy

SN - 1877-8585

IS - 4

ER -