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An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy’s Calciopoli scandal

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An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy’s Calciopoli scandal. / Buraimo, Babatunde; Migali, Giuseppe; Simmons, Robert.
In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78, No. 1, 02.2016, p. 22-41.

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Buraimo, B, Migali, G & Simmons, R 2016, 'An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy’s Calciopoli scandal', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 22-41. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12094

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Vancouver

Buraimo B, Migali G, Simmons R. An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy’s Calciopoli scandal. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2016 Feb;78(1):22-41. Epub 2015 Feb 20. doi: 10.1111/obes.12094

Author

Buraimo, Babatunde ; Migali, Giuseppe ; Simmons, Robert. / An analysis of consumer response to corruption : Italy’s Calciopoli scandal. In: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2016 ; Vol. 78, No. 1. pp. 22-41.

Bibtex

@article{cc08e33a429d4887a74645183d49df12,
title = "An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy{\textquoteright}s Calciopoli scandal",
abstract = "The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005–6 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league-imposed punishments on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices.Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we find that home attendances for convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment.We show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions.Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.",
author = "Babatunde Buraimo and Giuseppe Migali and Robert Simmons",
year = "2016",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1111/obes.12094",
language = "English",
volume = "78",
pages = "22--41",
journal = "Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics",
issn = "0305-9049",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An analysis of consumer response to corruption

T2 - Italy’s Calciopoli scandal

AU - Buraimo, Babatunde

AU - Migali, Giuseppe

AU - Simmons, Robert

PY - 2016/2

Y1 - 2016/2

N2 - The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005–6 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league-imposed punishments on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices.Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we find that home attendances for convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment.We show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions.Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.

AB - The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005–6 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behavior, following league-imposed punishments on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices.Using a difference-in-differences estimation method, we find that home attendances for convicted teams fell by around 16%, relative to those clubs not subject to punishment.We show further that the fall in attendances resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions.Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium.

U2 - 10.1111/obes.12094

DO - 10.1111/obes.12094

M3 - Journal article

VL - 78

SP - 22

EP - 41

JO - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics

SN - 0305-9049

IS - 1

ER -