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An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games

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An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games. / Winter, E.; Wooders, M.H.
In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 11, No. 2, 04.1994, p. 165-175.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E & Wooders, MH 1994, 'An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 165-175. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179212

APA

Winter, E., & Wooders, M. H. (1994). An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games. Social Choice and Welfare, 11(2), 165-175. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00179212

Vancouver

Winter E, Wooders MH. An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games. Social Choice and Welfare. 1994 Apr;11(2):165-175. doi: 10.1007/BF00179212

Author

Winter, E. ; Wooders, M.H. / An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 1994 ; Vol. 11, No. 2. pp. 165-175.

Bibtex

@article{81683827f0914eca8f0e3d086320e821,
title = "An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games",
abstract = "We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions and the f-core introduced by Kaneko and Wooders. Since coalitions are finite in both finite games and in continuum games, we can use the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for our axiomatization. Both properties are particularly appealing in large economies. {\textcopyright} 1994 Springer-Verlag.",
keywords = "Characteristic Form , Large Economy, Game Property, Finite Game , Continuum Game ",
author = "E. Winter and M.H. Wooders",
year = "1994",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1007/BF00179212",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "165--175",
journal = "Social Choice and Welfare",
issn = "0176-1714",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An axiomatization of the core for finite and continuum games

AU - Winter, E.

AU - Wooders, M.H.

PY - 1994/4

Y1 - 1994/4

N2 - We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions and the f-core introduced by Kaneko and Wooders. Since coalitions are finite in both finite games and in continuum games, we can use the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for our axiomatization. Both properties are particularly appealing in large economies. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.

AB - We provide a new axiomatization of the core of games in characteristic form. The games may have either finite sets of players or continuum sets of players and finite coalitions. Our research is based on Peleg's axiomatization for finite games and on the notions of measurement-consistent partitions and the f-core introduced by Kaneko and Wooders. Since coalitions are finite in both finite games and in continuum games, we can use the reduced game property and the converse reduced game property for our axiomatization. Both properties are particularly appealing in large economies. © 1994 Springer-Verlag.

KW - Characteristic Form

KW - Large Economy

KW - Game Property

KW - Finite Game

KW - Continuum Game

U2 - 10.1007/BF00179212

DO - 10.1007/BF00179212

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 165

EP - 175

JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

SN - 0176-1714

IS - 2

ER -