Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Conference contribution/Paper › peer-review
}
TY - GEN
T1 - An efficient pricing based protocol for broadcasting in wireless ad hoc networks
AU - Suri, Neeraj
AU - Narahari, Y.
AU - Manjunath, D.
PY - 2006/1/8
Y1 - 2006/1/8
N2 - In many applications of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes are owned by rational and intelligent users. In this paper, we call nodes selfish if they are owned by independent users and their only objective is to maximize their individual goals. In such situations, it may not be possible to use the existing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks as these protocols assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol without deviation. Stimulating cooperation among these nodes is an interesting and challenging problem. Providing incentives and pricing the transactions are well known approaches to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pricing mechanism called Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM). The phrase strategy proof here means that truth revelation of cost is a weakly dominant-strategy (in game theoretic terms) for each node. In order to steer our mechanism-design approach towards practical implementation, we compute the payments to nodes using a distributed algorithm. We also propose a new protocol for broadcast in wireless ad hoc network with selfish nodes based on IPNPM. The features of the proposed broadcast protocol are reliability and a significantly reduced number of packet forwards compared to the number of network nodes, which in turn leads to less system-wide power consumption to broadcast a single packet. Our simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed broadcast protocol. © 2006 IEEE.
AB - In many applications of wireless ad hoc networks, wireless nodes are owned by rational and intelligent users. In this paper, we call nodes selfish if they are owned by independent users and their only objective is to maximize their individual goals. In such situations, it may not be possible to use the existing protocols for wireless ad hoc networks as these protocols assume that nodes follow the prescribed protocol without deviation. Stimulating cooperation among these nodes is an interesting and challenging problem. Providing incentives and pricing the transactions are well known approaches to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for truthful broadcast protocol and strategy proof pricing mechanism called Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanism (IPNPM). The phrase strategy proof here means that truth revelation of cost is a weakly dominant-strategy (in game theoretic terms) for each node. In order to steer our mechanism-design approach towards practical implementation, we compute the payments to nodes using a distributed algorithm. We also propose a new protocol for broadcast in wireless ad hoc network with selfish nodes based on IPNPM. The features of the proposed broadcast protocol are reliability and a significantly reduced number of packet forwards compared to the number of network nodes, which in turn leads to less system-wide power consumption to broadcast a single packet. Our simulation results show the efficacy of the proposed broadcast protocol. © 2006 IEEE.
KW - Ad hoc networks
KW - Broadcasting
KW - Computer simulation
KW - Electric power utilization
KW - Intelligent agents
KW - Packet networks
KW - Immediate Predecessor Node Pricing Mechanisms (IPNPM)
KW - Intelligent users
KW - Wireless nodes
KW - Network protocols
U2 - 10.1109/COMSWA.2006.1665208
DO - 10.1109/COMSWA.2006.1665208
M3 - Conference contribution/Paper
SN - 0780395751
BT - 2006 1st International Conference on Communication Systems Software & Middleware
PB - IEEE
ER -