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An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators. / Wallace, Stein W; Philpott, Andy; Pettersen, Erling.
In: Decision Support Systems, Vol. 40, No. 3-4, 10.2005, p. 427-438.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Wallace, SW, Philpott, A & Pettersen, E 2005, 'An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators', Decision Support Systems, vol. 40, no. 3-4, pp. 427-438. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005

APA

Wallace, S. W., Philpott, A., & Pettersen, E. (2005). An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators. Decision Support Systems, 40(3-4), 427-438. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005

Vancouver

Wallace SW, Philpott A, Pettersen E. An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators. Decision Support Systems. 2005 Oct;40(3-4):427-438. doi: 10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005

Author

Wallace, Stein W ; Philpott, Andy ; Pettersen, Erling. / An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators. In: Decision Support Systems. 2005 ; Vol. 40, No. 3-4. pp. 427-438.

Bibtex

@article{ce11df5de6ca49eb95159be5a8519ba5,
title = "An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators",
abstract = "We consider a simple game-theoretical model in which an electricity retailer and a network owner offer incentives to consumers to shift load from a peak period to an off-peak period. Using a simple example, we compare the market outcomes from collusion with those from the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and examine the behaviour in this game when it is repeated in a situation in which agents have imperfect information.",
keywords = "Electricity distribution , Markets , Nash equilibrium",
author = "Wallace, {Stein W} and Andy Philpott and Erling Pettersen",
year = "2005",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005",
language = "English",
volume = "40",
pages = "427--438",
journal = "Decision Support Systems",
issn = "0167-9236",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3-4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An electricity market game between consumers, retailers and network operators

AU - Wallace, Stein W

AU - Philpott, Andy

AU - Pettersen, Erling

PY - 2005/10

Y1 - 2005/10

N2 - We consider a simple game-theoretical model in which an electricity retailer and a network owner offer incentives to consumers to shift load from a peak period to an off-peak period. Using a simple example, we compare the market outcomes from collusion with those from the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and examine the behaviour in this game when it is repeated in a situation in which agents have imperfect information.

AB - We consider a simple game-theoretical model in which an electricity retailer and a network owner offer incentives to consumers to shift load from a peak period to an off-peak period. Using a simple example, we compare the market outcomes from collusion with those from the equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and examine the behaviour in this game when it is repeated in a situation in which agents have imperfect information.

KW - Electricity distribution

KW - Markets

KW - Nash equilibrium

U2 - 10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005

DO - 10.1016/j.dss.2004.05.005

M3 - Journal article

VL - 40

SP - 427

EP - 438

JO - Decision Support Systems

JF - Decision Support Systems

SN - 0167-9236

IS - 3-4

ER -