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An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment

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An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment. / Winter, E.; Zamir, S.
In: Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, 09.2005, p. 363-385.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Winter, E & Zamir, S 2005, 'An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment', Japanese Economic Review, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 363-385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

APA

Winter, E., & Zamir, S. (2005). An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment. Japanese Economic Review, 56(3), 363-385. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

Vancouver

Winter E, Zamir S. An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment. Japanese Economic Review. 2005 Sept;56(3):363-385. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

Author

Winter, E. ; Zamir, S. / An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment. In: Japanese Economic Review. 2005 ; Vol. 56, No. 3. pp. 363-385.

Bibtex

@article{c352ff38c42e43e092be442edc1ec729,
title = "An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment",
abstract = "We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects' behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with prospecified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour closer to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the proposer's share is much larger than that of the responder. We have observed significant differences in the behaviour of real subjects depending on the type of {"}mutants{"} (virtual players) that were present in their environment. {\textcopyright} Japanese Economic Association 2005.",
keywords = "bargaining, equilibrium, modeling",
author = "E. Winter and S. Zamir",
year = "2005",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "363--385",
journal = "Japanese Economic Review",
issn = "1352-4739",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An experiment with ultimatum bargaining in a changing environment

AU - Winter, E.

AU - Zamir, S.

PY - 2005/9

Y1 - 2005/9

N2 - We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects' behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with prospecified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour closer to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the proposer's share is much larger than that of the responder. We have observed significant differences in the behaviour of real subjects depending on the type of "mutants" (virtual players) that were present in their environment. © Japanese Economic Association 2005.

AB - We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects' behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with prospecified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour closer to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, in which the proposer's share is much larger than that of the responder. We have observed significant differences in the behaviour of real subjects depending on the type of "mutants" (virtual players) that were present in their environment. © Japanese Economic Association 2005.

KW - bargaining

KW - equilibrium

KW - modeling

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2005.00329.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 56

SP - 363

EP - 385

JO - Japanese Economic Review

JF - Japanese Economic Review

SN - 1352-4739

IS - 3

ER -