Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > An experimental study of coordination and learn...

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games. / Rapoport, A.; Seale, D.A.; Winter, E.
In: Economic Theory, Vol. 16, No. 3, 11.2000, p. 661-687.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Rapoport, A, Seale, DA & Winter, E 2000, 'An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games', Economic Theory, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 661-687. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00020947

APA

Rapoport, A., Seale, D. A., & Winter, E. (2000). An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games. Economic Theory, 16(3), 661-687. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00020947

Vancouver

Rapoport A, Seale DA, Winter E. An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games. Economic Theory. 2000 Nov;16(3):661-687. doi: 10.1007/PL00020947

Author

Rapoport, A. ; Seale, D.A. ; Winter, E. / An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games. In: Economic Theory. 2000 ; Vol. 16, No. 3. pp. 661-687.

Bibtex

@article{b8e121de9f454d53a63da172a67522dd,
title = "An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games",
abstract = "Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements.",
keywords = "Adaptive learning, Coordination success, Large groups, Market entry games, Nash equilibrium solution",
author = "A. Rapoport and D.A. Seale and E. Winter",
year = "2000",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1007/PL00020947",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "661--687",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - An experimental study of coordination and learning in iterated two-market entry games

AU - Rapoport, A.

AU - Seale, D.A.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2000/11

Y1 - 2000/11

N2 - Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements.

AB - Tacit coordination in large groups is studied in an iterated market entry game with complete information and multiple market capacities that are varied randomly from period to period. On each period, each player must decide independently whether to enter any of the markets, and if entering, which of the two markets to enter. Across symmetric and asymmetric markets, we find remarkable coordination on the aggregate level, which is accounted for by the Nash equilibrium, together with considerable individual differences in frequency of entry and decision rules. With experience, the decisions of most players converge to decision rules with cutoff values on the combined market capacity that determine whether or not to enter but not which of the two markets to enter. This latter decision is determined probabilistically by the differential market capacities. The aggregate and individual results are accounted for quite well by a reinforcement-based learning model that combines deterministic and probabilistic elements.

KW - Adaptive learning

KW - Coordination success

KW - Large groups

KW - Market entry games

KW - Nash equilibrium solution

U2 - 10.1007/PL00020947

DO - 10.1007/PL00020947

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 661

EP - 687

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 3

ER -