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An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System

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An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System. / Fett, Daniel; Küsters, Ralf; Schmitz, Guido.
2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 2014.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

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Fett D, Küsters R, Schmitz G. An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System. In 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE. 2014 Epub 2014 May 18. doi: 10.1109/sp.2014.49

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Fett, Daniel ; Küsters, Ralf ; Schmitz, Guido. / An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System. 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE, 2014.

Bibtex

@inproceedings{3e0283c1e2e3412f8c63638370aff0fc,
title = "An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System",
abstract = "The web constitutes a complex infrastructure and, as demonstrated by numerous attacks, rigorous analysis of standards and web applications is indispensable. Inspired by successful prior work, in particular the work by Akhawe et al. as well as Bansal et al., in this work we propose a formal model for the web infrastructure. While unlike prior works, which aim at automatic analysis, our model so far is not directly amenable to automation, it is much more comprehensive and accurate with respect to the standards and specifications. As such, it can serve as a solid basis for the analysis of a broad range of standards and applications. As a case study and another important contribution of our work, we use our model to carry out the first rigorous analysis of the Browser ID system (a.k.a. Mozilla Persona), a recently developed complex real-world single sign-on system that employs technologies such as AJAX, cross-document messaging, and HTML5 web storage. Our analysis revealed a number of very critical flaws that could not have been captured in prior models. We propose fixes for the flaws, formally state relevant security properties, and prove that the fixed system in a setting with a so-called secondary identity provider satisfies these security properties in our model. The fixes for the most critical flaws have already been adopted by Mozilla and our findings have been rewarded by the Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program.",
author = "Daniel Fett and Ralf K{\"u}sters and Guido Schmitz",
year = "2014",
month = nov,
day = "20",
doi = "10.1109/sp.2014.49",
language = "English",
booktitle = "2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - An Expressive Model for the Web Infrastructure: Definition and Application to the Browser ID SSO System

AU - Fett, Daniel

AU - Küsters, Ralf

AU - Schmitz, Guido

PY - 2014/11/20

Y1 - 2014/11/20

N2 - The web constitutes a complex infrastructure and, as demonstrated by numerous attacks, rigorous analysis of standards and web applications is indispensable. Inspired by successful prior work, in particular the work by Akhawe et al. as well as Bansal et al., in this work we propose a formal model for the web infrastructure. While unlike prior works, which aim at automatic analysis, our model so far is not directly amenable to automation, it is much more comprehensive and accurate with respect to the standards and specifications. As such, it can serve as a solid basis for the analysis of a broad range of standards and applications. As a case study and another important contribution of our work, we use our model to carry out the first rigorous analysis of the Browser ID system (a.k.a. Mozilla Persona), a recently developed complex real-world single sign-on system that employs technologies such as AJAX, cross-document messaging, and HTML5 web storage. Our analysis revealed a number of very critical flaws that could not have been captured in prior models. We propose fixes for the flaws, formally state relevant security properties, and prove that the fixed system in a setting with a so-called secondary identity provider satisfies these security properties in our model. The fixes for the most critical flaws have already been adopted by Mozilla and our findings have been rewarded by the Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program.

AB - The web constitutes a complex infrastructure and, as demonstrated by numerous attacks, rigorous analysis of standards and web applications is indispensable. Inspired by successful prior work, in particular the work by Akhawe et al. as well as Bansal et al., in this work we propose a formal model for the web infrastructure. While unlike prior works, which aim at automatic analysis, our model so far is not directly amenable to automation, it is much more comprehensive and accurate with respect to the standards and specifications. As such, it can serve as a solid basis for the analysis of a broad range of standards and applications. As a case study and another important contribution of our work, we use our model to carry out the first rigorous analysis of the Browser ID system (a.k.a. Mozilla Persona), a recently developed complex real-world single sign-on system that employs technologies such as AJAX, cross-document messaging, and HTML5 web storage. Our analysis revealed a number of very critical flaws that could not have been captured in prior models. We propose fixes for the flaws, formally state relevant security properties, and prove that the fixed system in a setting with a so-called secondary identity provider satisfies these security properties in our model. The fixes for the most critical flaws have already been adopted by Mozilla and our findings have been rewarded by the Mozilla Security Bug Bounty Program.

U2 - 10.1109/sp.2014.49

DO - 10.1109/sp.2014.49

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

BT - 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

PB - IEEE

ER -