Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Gri...

Associated organisational unit

View graph of relations

Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Published

Standard

Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case. / Langer, Lucie; Smith, Paul; Hutle, Martin et al.
2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC). IEEE, 2016. p. 1-7.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paperpeer-review

Harvard

Langer, L, Smith, P, Hutle, M & Filho, AES 2016, Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case. in 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC). IEEE, pp. 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819

APA

Langer, L., Smith, P., Hutle, M., & Filho, A. E. S. (2016). Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case. In 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC) (pp. 1-7). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819

Vancouver

Langer L, Smith P, Hutle M, Filho AES. Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case. In 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC). IEEE. 2016. p. 1-7 doi: 10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819

Author

Langer, Lucie ; Smith, Paul ; Hutle, Martin et al. / Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case. 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC). IEEE, 2016. pp. 1-7

Bibtex

@inproceedings{62540ade27054bb49d27672aa7ec1252,
title = "Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case.",
abstract = "ICT and SCADA systems will play an increasingly operationally critical role in the smart grid. Cyber-attacks to these systems have the potential to result in outcomes in the physical domain. For example, power systems equipment could be damaged, reduced power quality could occur - potentially leading to blackouts - and, in extreme cases, result in safety-related incidents. Recently developed cybersecurity risk assessment guidelines for the smart grid reflect this understanding. However, they provide limited input about how these risks should be analysed. In this paper, we present how event trees - an inductive modelling technique - can be used to explore the potential impact of a cyber-attack to information assets in the smart grid. Using event tree analysis, we have examined cyber-attacks in the context of a voltage control use case, indicating how power grid protection measures may influence the outcome of such an attack and its physical impact to a smart grid.",
author = "Lucie Langer and Paul Smith and Martin Hutle and Filho, {Alberto E. Schaeffer}",
note = "DBLP License: DBLP's bibliographic metadata records provided through http://dblp.org/ are distributed under a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Although the bibliographic metadata records are provided consistent with CC0 1.0 Dedication, the content described by the metadata records is not. Content may be subject to copyright, rights of privacy, rights of publicity and other restrictions.",
year = "2016",
month = aug,
day = "11",
doi = "10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781467381512",
pages = "1--7",
booktitle = "2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC)",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Analysing cyber-physical attacks to a Smart Grid: A voltage control use case.

AU - Langer, Lucie

AU - Smith, Paul

AU - Hutle, Martin

AU - Filho, Alberto E. Schaeffer

N1 - DBLP License: DBLP's bibliographic metadata records provided through http://dblp.org/ are distributed under a Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. Although the bibliographic metadata records are provided consistent with CC0 1.0 Dedication, the content described by the metadata records is not. Content may be subject to copyright, rights of privacy, rights of publicity and other restrictions.

PY - 2016/8/11

Y1 - 2016/8/11

N2 - ICT and SCADA systems will play an increasingly operationally critical role in the smart grid. Cyber-attacks to these systems have the potential to result in outcomes in the physical domain. For example, power systems equipment could be damaged, reduced power quality could occur - potentially leading to blackouts - and, in extreme cases, result in safety-related incidents. Recently developed cybersecurity risk assessment guidelines for the smart grid reflect this understanding. However, they provide limited input about how these risks should be analysed. In this paper, we present how event trees - an inductive modelling technique - can be used to explore the potential impact of a cyber-attack to information assets in the smart grid. Using event tree analysis, we have examined cyber-attacks in the context of a voltage control use case, indicating how power grid protection measures may influence the outcome of such an attack and its physical impact to a smart grid.

AB - ICT and SCADA systems will play an increasingly operationally critical role in the smart grid. Cyber-attacks to these systems have the potential to result in outcomes in the physical domain. For example, power systems equipment could be damaged, reduced power quality could occur - potentially leading to blackouts - and, in extreme cases, result in safety-related incidents. Recently developed cybersecurity risk assessment guidelines for the smart grid reflect this understanding. However, they provide limited input about how these risks should be analysed. In this paper, we present how event trees - an inductive modelling technique - can be used to explore the potential impact of a cyber-attack to information assets in the smart grid. Using event tree analysis, we have examined cyber-attacks in the context of a voltage control use case, indicating how power grid protection measures may influence the outcome of such an attack and its physical impact to a smart grid.

U2 - 10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819

DO - 10.1109/PSCC.2016.7540819

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SN - 9781467381512

SP - 1

EP - 7

BT - 2016 Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC)

PB - IEEE

ER -