Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Tabakis, C. and Zanardi, M. (2017), ANTIDUMPING ECHOING. Econ Inq, 55: 655–681. doi:10.1111/ecin.12369 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.12369/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Antidumping echoing
AU - Tabakis, Chrysostomos
AU - Zanardi, Maurizio
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article:Tabakis, C. and Zanardi, M. (2017), ANTIDUMPING ECHOING. Econ Inq, 55: 655–681. doi:10.1111/ecin.12369 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.12369/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2017/4
Y1 - 2017/4
N2 - This paper documents that antidumping (AD) "echoing" (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political-economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political-economy-driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.
AB - This paper documents that antidumping (AD) "echoing" (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import-competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political-economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political-economy-driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.
KW - Antidumping
KW - political economy of trade protection
U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12369
DO - 10.1111/ecin.12369
M3 - Journal article
VL - 55
SP - 655
EP - 681
JO - Economic Inquiry
JF - Economic Inquiry
SN - 0095-2583
IS - 2
ER -