TY - JOUR

T1 - Antidumping law as a collusive device

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - In the United States many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements. In his model, all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn. Withdrawal depends on two key parameters: coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new data set is constructed to test the model on the U.S. experience for the period 1980–97. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model.

AB - In the United States many antidumping petitions are withdrawn before the investigations are completed. Prusa (1992) argues that petitions are used by domestic industries to induce foreign industries into collusive agreements. In his model, all antidumping petitions should be withdrawn, which is not the case. This paper provides a model in which only some petitions are withdrawn. Withdrawal depends on two key parameters: coordination cost and bargaining power of domestic and foreign industries. A new data set is constructed to test the model on the U.S. experience for the period 1980–97. The econometric analysis supports the theoretical conclusions of the model.

U2 - 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.005_1.x

DO - 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.005_1.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 95

EP - 122

JO - Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d'Économique

JF - Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d'Économique

SN - 0008-4085

IS - 1

ER -