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Attack when the World is not Watching?: U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Attack when the World is not Watching? U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. / Durante, Ruben; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina.
In: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 126, No. 3, 30.06.2018, p. 1085-1133.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Durante, R & Zhuravskaya, E 2018, 'Attack when the World is not Watching? U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 126, no. 3, pp. 1085-1133. https://doi.org/10.1086/697202

APA

Vancouver

Durante R, Zhuravskaya E. Attack when the World is not Watching? U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Journal of Political Economy. 2018 Jun 30;126(3):1085-1133. Epub 2018 May 7. doi: 10.1086/697202

Author

Durante, Ruben ; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina. / Attack when the World is not Watching? U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. In: Journal of Political Economy. 2018 ; Vol. 126, No. 3. pp. 1085-1133.

Bibtex

@article{0749d76b1c6b41cc8be4a92f9d8d9161,
title = "Attack when the World is not Watching?: U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict",
abstract = "Politicians may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with newsworthy events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur when US news on the following day is dominated by important predictable events. Strategic timing applies to attacks that bear risk of civilian casualties and are not too costly to postpone. Content analysis suggests that Israel{\textquoteright}s strategy aims at minimizing next-day coverage, which is especially charged with negative emotional content. Palestinian attacks do not appear to be timed to US news.",
author = "Ruben Durante and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya",
year = "2018",
month = jun,
day = "30",
doi = "10.1086/697202",
language = "English",
volume = "126",
pages = "1085--1133",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Attack when the World is not Watching?

T2 - U.S. Media and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

AU - Durante, Ruben

AU - Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina

PY - 2018/6/30

Y1 - 2018/6/30

N2 - Politicians may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with newsworthy events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur when US news on the following day is dominated by important predictable events. Strategic timing applies to attacks that bear risk of civilian casualties and are not too costly to postpone. Content analysis suggests that Israel’s strategy aims at minimizing next-day coverage, which is especially charged with negative emotional content. Palestinian attacks do not appear to be timed to US news.

AB - Politicians may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with newsworthy events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We find that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur when US news on the following day is dominated by important predictable events. Strategic timing applies to attacks that bear risk of civilian casualties and are not too costly to postpone. Content analysis suggests that Israel’s strategy aims at minimizing next-day coverage, which is especially charged with negative emotional content. Palestinian attacks do not appear to be timed to US news.

U2 - 10.1086/697202

DO - 10.1086/697202

M3 - Journal article

VL - 126

SP - 1085

EP - 1133

JO - Journal of Political Economy

JF - Journal of Political Economy

SN - 0022-3808

IS - 3

ER -