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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiment
AU - Barbosa, Klenio
AU - De Silva, Dakshina
AU - Yang, Liyu
AU - Yoshimoto, Hisayuki
N1 - Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of American Economic Association publications for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not distributed for profit or direct commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation, including the name of the author. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than AEA must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted.
PY - 2022/11/30
Y1 - 2022/11/30
N2 - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond-yield rate measurements and participation behavior.
AB - This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these estimates indicate that there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond-yield rate measurements and participation behavior.
U2 - 10.1257/mic.20200216
DO - 10.1257/mic.20200216
M3 - Journal article
VL - 14
SP - 394
EP - 419
JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
SN - 1945-7669
IS - 4
ER -