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Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership. / Dasgupta, Sudipto.
In: International Economic Review, Vol. 41, No. 3, 08.2000, p. 609-635.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S 2000, 'Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership', International Economic Review, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 609-635. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00078

APA

Dasgupta, S. (2000). Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership. International Economic Review, 41(3), 609-635. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00078

Vancouver

Dasgupta S. Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership. International Economic Review. 2000 Aug;41(3):609-635. doi: 10.1111/1468-2354.00078

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto. / Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership. In: International Economic Review. 2000 ; Vol. 41, No. 3. pp. 609-635.

Bibtex

@article{c33999a394af44fbada9a23bf0a279cf,
title = "Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership",
abstract = "This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We considera setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of invest- ment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can useor general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When thebenefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity partic-ipation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the down-stream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta",
year = "2000",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1111/1468-2354.00078",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "609--635",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bargaining, bonding, and partial ownership

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

PY - 2000/8

Y1 - 2000/8

N2 - This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We considera setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of invest- ment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can useor general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When thebenefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity partic-ipation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the down-stream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.

AB - This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We considera setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of invest- ment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can useor general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When thebenefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity partic-ipation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the down-stream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power.

U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.00078

DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.00078

M3 - Journal article

VL - 41

SP - 609

EP - 635

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 3

ER -