Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock c...

Electronic data

  • 1-s2.0-S0167268113003089-main

    Rights statement: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

    Final published version, 889 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests : experimental evidence. / Lim, Wooyoung; Matros, Alexander; Turocy, Ted.

In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 99, 03.2014, p. 155-167.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Lim, W, Matros, A & Turocy, T 2014, 'Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 99, pp. 155-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010

APA

Lim, W., Matros, A., & Turocy, T. (2014). Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 99, 155-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010

Vancouver

Lim W, Matros A, Turocy T. Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014 Mar;99:155-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010

Author

Lim, Wooyoung ; Matros, Alexander ; Turocy, Ted. / Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests : experimental evidence. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014 ; Vol. 99. pp. 155-167.

Bibtex

@article{909a33b49b044eb0bed350f04fb4a673,
title = "Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: experimental evidence",
abstract = "We explore how models of boundedly rational decision-making in games can explain the overdissipation of rents in laboratory Tullock contest games. Using a new series of experiments in which group size is varied across sessions, we find that models based on logit choice organize the data well. In this setting, logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a limit of a cognitive hierarchy (CH) model with logit best responses for appropriate parameters. While QRE captures the data well, the CH fits provide support for relaxing the equilibrium assumption. Both the QRE and CH models have parameters which capture boundedness of rationality. The maximum likelihood fits of both models yield parameters indicating rationality is more restricted as group size grows. Period-by-period adjustments of expenditures are more likely to be in the earnings-improving direction in smaller groups.",
keywords = "Contests, Rent-seeking , Laboratory experiments , Bounded rationality",
author = "Wooyoung Lim and Alexander Matros and Ted Turocy",
note = "This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.",
year = "2014",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010",
language = "English",
volume = "99",
pages = "155--167",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests

T2 - experimental evidence

AU - Lim, Wooyoung

AU - Matros, Alexander

AU - Turocy, Ted

N1 - This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

PY - 2014/3

Y1 - 2014/3

N2 - We explore how models of boundedly rational decision-making in games can explain the overdissipation of rents in laboratory Tullock contest games. Using a new series of experiments in which group size is varied across sessions, we find that models based on logit choice organize the data well. In this setting, logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a limit of a cognitive hierarchy (CH) model with logit best responses for appropriate parameters. While QRE captures the data well, the CH fits provide support for relaxing the equilibrium assumption. Both the QRE and CH models have parameters which capture boundedness of rationality. The maximum likelihood fits of both models yield parameters indicating rationality is more restricted as group size grows. Period-by-period adjustments of expenditures are more likely to be in the earnings-improving direction in smaller groups.

AB - We explore how models of boundedly rational decision-making in games can explain the overdissipation of rents in laboratory Tullock contest games. Using a new series of experiments in which group size is varied across sessions, we find that models based on logit choice organize the data well. In this setting, logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a limit of a cognitive hierarchy (CH) model with logit best responses for appropriate parameters. While QRE captures the data well, the CH fits provide support for relaxing the equilibrium assumption. Both the QRE and CH models have parameters which capture boundedness of rationality. The maximum likelihood fits of both models yield parameters indicating rationality is more restricted as group size grows. Period-by-period adjustments of expenditures are more likely to be in the earnings-improving direction in smaller groups.

KW - Contests

KW - Rent-seeking

KW - Laboratory experiments

KW - Bounded rationality

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.010

M3 - Journal article

VL - 99

SP - 155

EP - 167

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

SN - 0167-2681

ER -