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Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries

Research output: Working paper

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Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries. / Deltas, George; Polborn, Mattias K.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2018. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Deltas, G & Polborn, MK 2018 'Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Deltas, G., & Polborn, M. K. (2018). Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Deltas G, Polborn MK. Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2018 Jul. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Deltas, George ; Polborn, Mattias K. / Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2018. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{cf8a676f38b44ad19b97954838ce717d,
title = "Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries",
abstract = "When candidates in primary elections are ideologically differentiated (e.g., conservatives and moderates in the Republican party), then candidates with similar positions affect each others{\textquoteright} vote shares more strongly than candidates with different ideological positions. We measure this effect in U.S. Presidential primaries and show that it is of first order importance. We also show that voterbeliefs about the candidates harden over the course of the primary, as manifested in the variability of candidate vote shares. We discuss models of sequential voting that cannot yield this pattern of results, and propose an explanation based on a model with horizontally and vertically differentiatedcandidates and incompletely informed voters. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we also show that, in more conservative states, low quality conservative candidates do better relative to high quality conservatives, and vice versa. ",
keywords = "Voting, primary elections, simultaneous versus sequential elections",
author = "George Deltas and Polborn, {Mattias K.}",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries

AU - Deltas, George

AU - Polborn, Mattias K.

PY - 2018/7

Y1 - 2018/7

N2 - When candidates in primary elections are ideologically differentiated (e.g., conservatives and moderates in the Republican party), then candidates with similar positions affect each others’ vote shares more strongly than candidates with different ideological positions. We measure this effect in U.S. Presidential primaries and show that it is of first order importance. We also show that voterbeliefs about the candidates harden over the course of the primary, as manifested in the variability of candidate vote shares. We discuss models of sequential voting that cannot yield this pattern of results, and propose an explanation based on a model with horizontally and vertically differentiatedcandidates and incompletely informed voters. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we also show that, in more conservative states, low quality conservative candidates do better relative to high quality conservatives, and vice versa.

AB - When candidates in primary elections are ideologically differentiated (e.g., conservatives and moderates in the Republican party), then candidates with similar positions affect each others’ vote shares more strongly than candidates with different ideological positions. We measure this effect in U.S. Presidential primaries and show that it is of first order importance. We also show that voterbeliefs about the candidates harden over the course of the primary, as manifested in the variability of candidate vote shares. We discuss models of sequential voting that cannot yield this pattern of results, and propose an explanation based on a model with horizontally and vertically differentiatedcandidates and incompletely informed voters. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we also show that, in more conservative states, low quality conservative candidates do better relative to high quality conservatives, and vice versa.

KW - Voting

KW - primary elections

KW - simultaneous versus sequential elections

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Candidate Competition and Voter Learning in the 2000-2012 US Presidential Primaries

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -