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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Cartel organization, price discrimination, and selection of transatlantic migrants
T2 - 1899–1911
AU - Deltas, George
AU - Sicotte, Richard
PY - 2017/1/29
Y1 - 2017/1/29
N2 - We study the effects of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels on tourist/business and migrant traffic. Collusion had a smaller effect on first and second class service relative to third class service. Its effects were proportionately stronger eastbound, but less important in absolute numbers given smaller eastbound traffic. Collusion-driven consumer substitution across classes was small but non-negligible. Thus, collusion affected migrant traffic far more than tourist/business traffic. We also confirm that collusion led to higher fares across all cabin classes, especially for steerage. We construct and calibrate an analytical model and show that the pattern of observed prices and volumes are consistent with a profit-maximizing cartel, thus buttressing the hypothesis that the collusion effects were causal. Finally, we document that collusion led to positive selection of migrants, as measured by literacy rates and financial resources.
AB - We study the effects of trans-Atlantic passenger shipping cartels on tourist/business and migrant traffic. Collusion had a smaller effect on first and second class service relative to third class service. Its effects were proportionately stronger eastbound, but less important in absolute numbers given smaller eastbound traffic. Collusion-driven consumer substitution across classes was small but non-negligible. Thus, collusion affected migrant traffic far more than tourist/business traffic. We also confirm that collusion led to higher fares across all cabin classes, especially for steerage. We construct and calibrate an analytical model and show that the pattern of observed prices and volumes are consistent with a profit-maximizing cartel, thus buttressing the hypothesis that the collusion effects were causal. Finally, we document that collusion led to positive selection of migrants, as measured by literacy rates and financial resources.
KW - L92
KW - N71
KW - N73
U2 - 10.1002/soej.12175
DO - 10.1002/soej.12175
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85006054753
VL - 83
SP - 668
EP - 704
JO - Southern Economic Journal
JF - Southern Economic Journal
SN - 0038-4038
IS - 3
ER -