Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Causation and causal selection in the biopsycho...

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Causation and causal selection in the biopsychosocial model of health and disease

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Causation and causal selection in the biopsychosocial model of health and disease. / Maung, Hane.

In: European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 2, 31.10.2021, p. 5-27.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

Author

Maung, Hane. / Causation and causal selection in the biopsychosocial model of health and disease. In: European Journal of Analytic Philosophy. 2021 ; Vol. 17, No. 2. pp. 5-27.

Bibtex

@article{029892ed79ab48c3b805c9962e96f6e3,
title = "Causation and causal selection in the biopsychosocial model of health and disease",
abstract = "In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are unnecessary for a defence of biopsychosocial causation, as the roles of multiple and diverse factors in disease causation can be readily accommodated by a more widely accepted and less metaphysically contentious account of causation. I then raise the more general concern that they are misdiagnosing the problem with the traditional version of the biopsychosocial model. The challenge when developing an explanatorily valuable version of the biopsychosocial model, I argue, is not so much providing an adequate account of biopsychosocial causation, but providing an adequate account of causal selection. Finally, I consider how this problem may be solved to arrive at a more explanatorily valuable and clinically useful version of the biopsychosocial model.",
keywords = "Derek Bolton, Grant Gillett, biopsychosocial model, causation, causal selection",
author = "Hane Maung",
year = "2021",
month = oct,
day = "31",
doi = "10.31820/ejap.17.2.6",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "5--27",
journal = "European Journal of Analytic Philosophy",
issn = "1849-0514",
publisher = "University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Causation and causal selection in the biopsychosocial model of health and disease

AU - Maung, Hane

PY - 2021/10/31

Y1 - 2021/10/31

N2 - In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are unnecessary for a defence of biopsychosocial causation, as the roles of multiple and diverse factors in disease causation can be readily accommodated by a more widely accepted and less metaphysically contentious account of causation. I then raise the more general concern that they are misdiagnosing the problem with the traditional version of the biopsychosocial model. The challenge when developing an explanatorily valuable version of the biopsychosocial model, I argue, is not so much providing an adequate account of biopsychosocial causation, but providing an adequate account of causal selection. Finally, I consider how this problem may be solved to arrive at a more explanatorily valuable and clinically useful version of the biopsychosocial model.

AB - In The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, Derek Bolton and Grant Gillett argue that a defensible updated version of the biopsychosocial model requires a metaphysically adequate account of disease causation that can accommodate biological, psychological, and social factors. This present paper offers a philosophical critique of their account of biopsychosocial causation. I argue that their account relies on claims about the normativity and the semantic content of biological information that are metaphysically contentious. Moreover, I suggest that these claims are unnecessary for a defence of biopsychosocial causation, as the roles of multiple and diverse factors in disease causation can be readily accommodated by a more widely accepted and less metaphysically contentious account of causation. I then raise the more general concern that they are misdiagnosing the problem with the traditional version of the biopsychosocial model. The challenge when developing an explanatorily valuable version of the biopsychosocial model, I argue, is not so much providing an adequate account of biopsychosocial causation, but providing an adequate account of causal selection. Finally, I consider how this problem may be solved to arrive at a more explanatorily valuable and clinically useful version of the biopsychosocial model.

KW - Derek Bolton

KW - Grant Gillett

KW - biopsychosocial model

KW - causation

KW - causal selection

U2 - 10.31820/ejap.17.2.6

DO - 10.31820/ejap.17.2.6

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

SP - 5

EP - 27

JO - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy

JF - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy

SN - 1849-0514

IS - 2

ER -