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CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms. / He, Lerong; Conyon, Martin.
In: Journal of Derivatives Accounting, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2004, p. 47-60.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

He, L & Conyon, M 2004, 'CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms', Journal of Derivatives Accounting, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 47-60. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051

APA

He, L., & Conyon, M. (2004). CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms. Journal of Derivatives Accounting, 1(1), 47-60. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051

Vancouver

He L, Conyon M. CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms. Journal of Derivatives Accounting. 2004;1(1):47-60. doi: 10.1142/S0219868104000051

Author

He, Lerong ; Conyon, Martin. / CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms. In: Journal of Derivatives Accounting. 2004 ; Vol. 1, No. 1. pp. 47-60.

Bibtex

@article{cfcb8916c06d4dacab680ca795a3677a,
title = "CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms",
abstract = "This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.",
keywords = "Corporate governance, pay for performance , equity incentives",
author = "Lerong He and Martin Conyon",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1142/S0219868104000051",
language = "English",
volume = "1",
pages = "47--60",
journal = "Journal of Derivatives Accounting",
issn = "0219-8681",
publisher = "World Scientific Publishing",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - CEO Compensation, Incentives and Governance in New Enterprise Firms

AU - He, Lerong

AU - Conyon, Martin

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.

AB - This study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.

KW - Corporate governance

KW - pay for performance

KW - equity incentives

U2 - 10.1142/S0219868104000051

DO - 10.1142/S0219868104000051

M3 - Journal article

VL - 1

SP - 47

EP - 60

JO - Journal of Derivatives Accounting

JF - Journal of Derivatives Accounting

SN - 0219-8681

IS - 1

ER -