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CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct

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CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct. / Chircop, Justin; Tarsalewska, Monika; Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka.
In: The Accounting Review, Vol. 100, No. 1, 01.01.2025, p. 139-167.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Chircop, J, Tarsalewska, M & Trzeciakiewicz, A 2025, 'CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct', The Accounting Review, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 139-167. https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2020-0648

APA

Chircop, J., Tarsalewska, M., & Trzeciakiewicz, A. (2025). CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct. The Accounting Review, 100(1), 139-167. https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2020-0648

Vancouver

Chircop J, Tarsalewska M, Trzeciakiewicz A. CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct. The Accounting Review. 2025 Jan 1;100(1):139-167. doi: 10.2308/TAR-2020-0648

Author

Chircop, Justin ; Tarsalewska, Monika ; Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka. / CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct. In: The Accounting Review. 2025 ; Vol. 100, No. 1. pp. 139-167.

Bibtex

@article{24dfe5da2f02446a97d028376ca85c74,
title = "CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct",
abstract = "We examine the relation between CEO risk taking equity incentives, as captured by CEO vega, and workplace misconduct. Workplace misconduct includes health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other violations broadly related to labor exploitation, and it results in significant economic costs. Using regression analysis, matched sample tests, and a quasi-natural experiment, we find a positive relation between CEO vega and workplace misconduct. We identify a reduction in discretionary expenses and increased employee workload as channels through which CEO vega affects workplace misconduct.",
author = "Justin Chircop and Monika Tarsalewska and Agnieszka Trzeciakiewicz",
year = "2025",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.2308/TAR-2020-0648",
language = "English",
volume = "100",
pages = "139--167",
journal = "The Accounting Review",
issn = "0001-4826",
publisher = "American Accounting Association",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - CEO risk taking equity incentives and workplace misconduct

AU - Chircop, Justin

AU - Tarsalewska, Monika

AU - Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka

PY - 2025/1/1

Y1 - 2025/1/1

N2 - We examine the relation between CEO risk taking equity incentives, as captured by CEO vega, and workplace misconduct. Workplace misconduct includes health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other violations broadly related to labor exploitation, and it results in significant economic costs. Using regression analysis, matched sample tests, and a quasi-natural experiment, we find a positive relation between CEO vega and workplace misconduct. We identify a reduction in discretionary expenses and increased employee workload as channels through which CEO vega affects workplace misconduct.

AB - We examine the relation between CEO risk taking equity incentives, as captured by CEO vega, and workplace misconduct. Workplace misconduct includes health and safety violations, non-compliance with labor laws, and other violations broadly related to labor exploitation, and it results in significant economic costs. Using regression analysis, matched sample tests, and a quasi-natural experiment, we find a positive relation between CEO vega and workplace misconduct. We identify a reduction in discretionary expenses and increased employee workload as channels through which CEO vega affects workplace misconduct.

U2 - 10.2308/TAR-2020-0648

DO - 10.2308/TAR-2020-0648

M3 - Journal article

VL - 100

SP - 139

EP - 167

JO - The Accounting Review

JF - The Accounting Review

SN - 0001-4826

IS - 1

ER -