Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Chapter 53 The shapley value

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Chapter 53 The shapley value

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Chapter

Published

Standard

Chapter 53 The shapley value. / Winter, E.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. ed. / Robert J. Aumann; Sergiu Hart. Vol. 3 North-Holland, 2002.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Chapter

Harvard

Winter, E 2002, Chapter 53 The shapley value. in RJ Aumann & S Hart (eds), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. vol. 3, North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3

APA

Winter, E. (2002). Chapter 53 The shapley value. In R. J. Aumann, & S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications (Vol. 3). North-Holland. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3

Vancouver

Winter E. Chapter 53 The shapley value. In Aumann RJ, Hart S, editors, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Vol. 3. North-Holland. 2002 doi: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3

Author

Winter, E. / Chapter 53 The shapley value. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. editor / Robert J. Aumann ; Sergiu Hart. Vol. 3 North-Holland, 2002.

Bibtex

@inbook{07952f735c93409d854177a069ebb0fc,
title = "Chapter 53 The shapley value",
abstract = "This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The chapter also surveys some of the literature that generalizes the notion of the value to situations in which a priori cooperation structure exists, as well as a different literature that discusses the relation between the Shapley value and models of non-cooperative bargaining. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applied side of the Shapley value, primarily in the context of cost allocation and voting. {\textcopyright} 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.",
keywords = "coalitions, cooperation structures, cooperative games, Shapley value, voting",
author = "E. Winter",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3",
language = "English",
isbn = "9780444894281 ",
volume = "3",
editor = "Aumann, {Robert J.} and Sergiu Hart",
booktitle = "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications",
publisher = "North-Holland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Chapter 53 The shapley value

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The chapter also surveys some of the literature that generalizes the notion of the value to situations in which a priori cooperation structure exists, as well as a different literature that discusses the relation between the Shapley value and models of non-cooperative bargaining. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applied side of the Shapley value, primarily in the context of cost allocation and voting. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

AB - This chapter surveys some of the literature in game theory that has emerged from Shapley's seminal paper on the Value. The survey includes both contributions which offer different interpretations of the Shapley value as well as several different ways to characterize the value axiomatically. The chapter also surveys some of the literature that generalizes the notion of the value to situations in which a priori cooperation structure exists, as well as a different literature that discusses the relation between the Shapley value and models of non-cooperative bargaining. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the applied side of the Shapley value, primarily in the context of cost allocation and voting. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

KW - coalitions

KW - cooperation structures

KW - cooperative games

KW - Shapley value

KW - voting

U2 - 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3

DO - 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03016-3

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9780444894281

VL - 3

BT - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

A2 - Aumann, Robert J.

A2 - Hart, Sergiu

PB - North-Holland

ER -