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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Experimental Child Psychology, 151, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

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Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks. / Brandt, Silke; Buttelmann, David; Lieven, Elena et al.
In: Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Vol. 151, 11.2016, p. 131-143.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Brandt, S, Buttelmann, D, Lieven, E & Tomasello, M 2016, 'Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks', Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, vol. 151, pp. 131-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

APA

Brandt, S., Buttelmann, D., Lieven, E., & Tomasello, M. (2016). Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 151, 131-143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

Vancouver

Brandt S, Buttelmann D, Lieven E, Tomasello M. Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 2016 Nov;151:131-143. Epub 2016 Apr 8. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

Author

Brandt, Silke ; Buttelmann, David ; Lieven, Elena et al. / Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks. In: Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 2016 ; Vol. 151. pp. 131-143.

Bibtex

@article{3ccd868e39c041928d76473a38d2bbea,
title = "Children{\textquoteright}s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks",
abstract = "De Villiers (2007) and others have claimed that children come to understand false beliefs as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker{\textquoteright}s epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children (N=64) of 3 and 4 years of age were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first-person or a third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., I think the sticker is in the red box or The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box, respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others{\textquoteright} false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own than of others{\textquoteright} false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children{\textquoteright}s comprehension of their own false belief was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children{\textquoteright}s false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others{\textquoteright} beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.",
keywords = "Theory-of-mind development, False belief, First-language acquisition, Complement clauses, Mental verbs, Epistemic modality",
author = "Silke Brandt and David Buttelmann and Elena Lieven and Michael Tomasello",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Experimental Child Psychology, 151, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004",
year = "2016",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004",
language = "English",
volume = "151",
pages = "131--143",
journal = "Journal of Experimental Child Psychology",
issn = "0022-0965",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Children’s understanding of first and third person perspectives in complement clauses and false belief tasks

AU - Brandt, Silke

AU - Buttelmann, David

AU - Lieven, Elena

AU - Tomasello, Michael

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Experimental Child Psychology, 151, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

PY - 2016/11

Y1 - 2016/11

N2 - De Villiers (2007) and others have claimed that children come to understand false beliefs as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker’s epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children (N=64) of 3 and 4 years of age were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first-person or a third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., I think the sticker is in the red box or The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box, respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own than of others’ false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children’s comprehension of their own false belief was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children’s false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others’ beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.

AB - De Villiers (2007) and others have claimed that children come to understand false beliefs as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker’s epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children (N=64) of 3 and 4 years of age were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first-person or a third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., I think the sticker is in the red box or The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box, respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others’ false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own than of others’ false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children’s comprehension of their own false belief was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children’s false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others’ beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks.

KW - Theory-of-mind development

KW - False belief

KW - First-language acquisition

KW - Complement clauses

KW - Mental verbs

KW - Epistemic modality

U2 - 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.03.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 151

SP - 131

EP - 143

JO - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

JF - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

SN - 0022-0965

ER -