Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in International Affairs following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version JINGHAN ZENG, SHAUN BRESLIN; China's ‘new type of Great Power relations’: a G2 with Chinese characteristics?, International Affairs, Volume 92, Issue 4, 1 July 2016, Pages 773–794, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12656 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/92/4/773/2688082
Accepted author manuscript, 661 KB, PDF document
Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
<mark>Journal publication date</mark> | 07/2016 |
---|---|
<mark>Journal</mark> | International Affairs |
Issue number | 4 |
Volume | 92 |
Number of pages | 23 |
Pages (from-to) | 773-794 |
Publication Status | Published |
Early online date | 20/06/16 |
<mark>Original language</mark> | English |
The rise of China has been reshaping how the country sees its own role in the world. China has become increasingly willing to move from being a norm and system taker to a norm and system shaper (if not yet maker). One example is Xi Jinping's promotion of 'a new type of Great Power relations' designed to create a strategic space in which to operate. By using a mixed quantitative/qualitative analysis, we analyse 141 Chinese articles titled with 'new type of Great Power relations'. We find that although Chinese analysts and policy makers rejected the idea of a G2 in 2009, the mainstream discourse has rapidly shifted to what we call a 'G2 with Chinese characteristics' which indicates a fundamental shift in Chinese evaluation of the power status of itself and others. While some Chinese scholars consider China to have already achieved the status as the world's No. 2 or even a superpower, the mainstream discourse views China as both a Great Power and a rising power at the same time. This, we argue, moderates the expectations of what China can and should do to resolve global problems despite its great power status.