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Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam

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Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam. / Schaufelbuehl, Janick Marina; Wyss, Marco; Bott, Sandra.
In: The International History Review, Vol. 37, No. 5, 01.09.2015, p. 1014-1036.

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Schaufelbuehl JM, Wyss M, Bott S. Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam. The International History Review. 2015 Sept 1;37(5):1014-1036. Epub 2015 Aug 6. doi: 10.1080/07075332.2015.1046386

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Schaufelbuehl, Janick Marina ; Wyss, Marco ; Bott, Sandra. / Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War : Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam. In: The International History Review. 2015 ; Vol. 37, No. 5. pp. 1014-1036.

Bibtex

@article{64466e0553504062a46e16f40737e36c,
title = "Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam",
abstract = "This article examines neutral Switzerland's recognition policy towards the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. Drawing comparisons with other neutrals, notably Austria and Sweden, allows us to assess the credibility of neutrality in the Global Cold War. All three neutrals explicitly or implicitly aimed to reinforce their neutrality through the principle of universality, which entailed the recognition of all regimes, no matter their political couleur. Yet this principle was not applied consistently, but rather pragmatically. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Switzerland, as well as Austria and Sweden, favoured the Western-oriented over the Communist halves of Korea and Vietnam. Thereby, this article argues, they undermined the credibility of neutrality. They were, however, willing to take that risk, because they feared that the recognition of North Korea and North Vietnam could irritate the United States, and provoke East German claims for recognition, which was undesirable due to the Hallstein doctrine and West Germany's economic weight. It was only with the rise of the Third World as a political force, and the softening of the US position that the neutrals, which saw themselves in competition with each other for status and influence, eventually recognised North Korea and North Vietnam.",
keywords = "neutrality, Switzerland, cold war, Korea, Vietnam",
author = "Schaufelbuehl, {Janick Marina} and Marco Wyss and Sandra Bott",
year = "2015",
month = sep,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1080/07075332.2015.1046386",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "1014--1036",
journal = "The International History Review",
issn = "1949-6540",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War

T2 - Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam

AU - Schaufelbuehl, Janick Marina

AU - Wyss, Marco

AU - Bott, Sandra

PY - 2015/9/1

Y1 - 2015/9/1

N2 - This article examines neutral Switzerland's recognition policy towards the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. Drawing comparisons with other neutrals, notably Austria and Sweden, allows us to assess the credibility of neutrality in the Global Cold War. All three neutrals explicitly or implicitly aimed to reinforce their neutrality through the principle of universality, which entailed the recognition of all regimes, no matter their political couleur. Yet this principle was not applied consistently, but rather pragmatically. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Switzerland, as well as Austria and Sweden, favoured the Western-oriented over the Communist halves of Korea and Vietnam. Thereby, this article argues, they undermined the credibility of neutrality. They were, however, willing to take that risk, because they feared that the recognition of North Korea and North Vietnam could irritate the United States, and provoke East German claims for recognition, which was undesirable due to the Hallstein doctrine and West Germany's economic weight. It was only with the rise of the Third World as a political force, and the softening of the US position that the neutrals, which saw themselves in competition with each other for status and influence, eventually recognised North Korea and North Vietnam.

AB - This article examines neutral Switzerland's recognition policy towards the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. Drawing comparisons with other neutrals, notably Austria and Sweden, allows us to assess the credibility of neutrality in the Global Cold War. All three neutrals explicitly or implicitly aimed to reinforce their neutrality through the principle of universality, which entailed the recognition of all regimes, no matter their political couleur. Yet this principle was not applied consistently, but rather pragmatically. Until the beginning of the 1970s, Switzerland, as well as Austria and Sweden, favoured the Western-oriented over the Communist halves of Korea and Vietnam. Thereby, this article argues, they undermined the credibility of neutrality. They were, however, willing to take that risk, because they feared that the recognition of North Korea and North Vietnam could irritate the United States, and provoke East German claims for recognition, which was undesirable due to the Hallstein doctrine and West Germany's economic weight. It was only with the rise of the Third World as a political force, and the softening of the US position that the neutrals, which saw themselves in competition with each other for status and influence, eventually recognised North Korea and North Vietnam.

KW - neutrality

KW - Switzerland

KW - cold war

KW - Korea

KW - Vietnam

U2 - 10.1080/07075332.2015.1046386

DO - 10.1080/07075332.2015.1046386

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 1014

EP - 1036

JO - The International History Review

JF - The International History Review

SN - 1949-6540

IS - 5

ER -