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  • Maung 2023 Classifying Sexes

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Classifying sexes

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Classifying sexes. / Maung, H.H.
In: DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 26.06.2023, p. 35-52.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Maung, HH 2023, 'Classifying sexes', DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 35-52. https://doi.org/10.21825/digest.84674

APA

Maung, H. H. (2023). Classifying sexes. DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies, 10(1), 35-52. https://doi.org/10.21825/digest.84674

Vancouver

Maung HH. Classifying sexes. DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies. 2023 Jun 26;10(1):35-52. doi: 10.21825/digest.84674

Author

Maung, H.H. / Classifying sexes. In: DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies. 2023 ; Vol. 10, No. 1. pp. 35-52.

Bibtex

@article{e0d4cc6e620043f5893290161d093090,
title = "Classifying sexes",
abstract = "In the political discourse regarding gender identity, the concept of biological sex has been weaponised by gender critical commentators to oppose gender affirmation for trans people. Recently, these commentators have appealed to an essentialist model of sex based on anisogamy, or relative gamete size, to argue that one{\textquoteright}s sex is an immutable characteristic. I argue that the gender critical argument is unsound. The diverse purposes of sex classification and the complex variability of people{\textquoteright}s sexual characteristics show that an essentialist model is untenable. I then consider how a more adequate theoretical framework from the philosophy of biology can accommodate this complexity and capture how sex is classified in relevant contexts. Further implications of the framework are explored which concern the vagueness, polysemy, and mutability of sex. These undercut the gender critical argument and show that the appeal to biological sex fails to undermine gender affirmation for trans people.",
author = "H.H. Maung",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
day = "26",
doi = "10.21825/digest.84674",
language = "English",
volume = "10",
pages = "35--52",
journal = "DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Classifying sexes

AU - Maung, H.H.

PY - 2023/6/26

Y1 - 2023/6/26

N2 - In the political discourse regarding gender identity, the concept of biological sex has been weaponised by gender critical commentators to oppose gender affirmation for trans people. Recently, these commentators have appealed to an essentialist model of sex based on anisogamy, or relative gamete size, to argue that one’s sex is an immutable characteristic. I argue that the gender critical argument is unsound. The diverse purposes of sex classification and the complex variability of people’s sexual characteristics show that an essentialist model is untenable. I then consider how a more adequate theoretical framework from the philosophy of biology can accommodate this complexity and capture how sex is classified in relevant contexts. Further implications of the framework are explored which concern the vagueness, polysemy, and mutability of sex. These undercut the gender critical argument and show that the appeal to biological sex fails to undermine gender affirmation for trans people.

AB - In the political discourse regarding gender identity, the concept of biological sex has been weaponised by gender critical commentators to oppose gender affirmation for trans people. Recently, these commentators have appealed to an essentialist model of sex based on anisogamy, or relative gamete size, to argue that one’s sex is an immutable characteristic. I argue that the gender critical argument is unsound. The diverse purposes of sex classification and the complex variability of people’s sexual characteristics show that an essentialist model is untenable. I then consider how a more adequate theoretical framework from the philosophy of biology can accommodate this complexity and capture how sex is classified in relevant contexts. Further implications of the framework are explored which concern the vagueness, polysemy, and mutability of sex. These undercut the gender critical argument and show that the appeal to biological sex fails to undermine gender affirmation for trans people.

U2 - 10.21825/digest.84674

DO - 10.21825/digest.84674

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

SP - 35

EP - 52

JO - DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies

JF - DiGeSt - Journal of Diversity and Gender Studies

IS - 1

ER -