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Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers. / Foucart, R.; Garsous, G.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 71, No. 2, 01.10.2018, p. 507-527.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Foucart, R & Garsous, G 2018, 'Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers', Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 71, no. 2, pp. 507-527. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

APA

Foucart, R., & Garsous, G. (2018). Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers. Environmental and Resource Economics, 71(2), 507-527. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

Vancouver

Foucart R, Garsous G. Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2018 Oct 1;71(2):507-527. doi: 10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

Author

Foucart, R. ; Garsous, G. / Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers. In: Environmental and Resource Economics. 2018 ; Vol. 71, No. 2. pp. 507-527.

Bibtex

@article{35226251aa86456a896d88a9dcb817ad,
title = "Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers",
abstract = "We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between developed and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by developing countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not sufficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance their absorptive capacities. {\textcopyright} 2017, Springer Science+Business Media B.V.",
keywords = "Abatements, Climate change, Cross-country spillovers, Technology investments, Developing countries, Economic and social effects, Environmental technology, Investments, Absorptive capacity, Clean technologies, Climate change mitigation, Developed countries, Technology spillovers, abatement cost, cleanup, climate change, developing world, environmental economics, environmental technology, investment, mitigation, spillover effect",
author = "R. Foucart and G. Garsous",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3",
year = "2018",
month = oct,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3",
language = "English",
volume = "71",
pages = "507--527",
journal = "Environmental and Resource Economics",
issn = "0924-6460",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Climate Change Mitigation with Technology Spillovers

AU - Foucart, R.

AU - Garsous, G.

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

PY - 2018/10/1

Y1 - 2018/10/1

N2 - We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between developed and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by developing countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not sufficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance their absorptive capacities. © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

AB - We explore the implications of an increase in clean technology spillovers between developed and developing countries. We build a game of abatements in which players are linked with technology spillovers determined by an initial choice of absorptive capacities by developing countries. We show that, within a non-cooperative framework, the response of clean technology investments in developed countries to an increase in cross-country technology spillovers is ambiguous. If the marginal benefits of these additional abatements are not sufficiently high, developed countries have a strategic incentive to decrease investments. Such a strategic response jeopardizes the initial effects of an increase in technology spillovers on climate change mitigation and decreases the incentives for developing countries to enhance their absorptive capacities. © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

KW - Abatements

KW - Climate change

KW - Cross-country spillovers

KW - Technology investments

KW - Developing countries

KW - Economic and social effects

KW - Environmental technology

KW - Investments

KW - Absorptive capacity

KW - Clean technologies

KW - Climate change mitigation

KW - Developed countries

KW - Technology spillovers

KW - abatement cost

KW - cleanup

KW - climate change

KW - developing world

KW - environmental economics

KW - environmental technology

KW - investment

KW - mitigation

KW - spillover effect

U2 - 10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

DO - 10.1007/s10640-017-0170-3

M3 - Journal article

VL - 71

SP - 507

EP - 527

JO - Environmental and Resource Economics

JF - Environmental and Resource Economics

SN - 0924-6460

IS - 2

ER -