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Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

Research output: Working paper

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Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. / Moulin, Herve; Ray, Indrajit; Sen Gupta, Sonali.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; Vol. 2014, No. 24).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Moulin, H, Ray, I & Sen Gupta, S 2014 'Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game' Economics Working Paper Series, no. 24, vol. 2014, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Moulin, H., Ray, I., & Sen Gupta, S. (2014). Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. (Economics Working Paper Series; Vol. 2014, No. 24). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Moulin H, Ray I, Sen Gupta S. Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; 24).

Author

Moulin, Herve ; Ray, Indrajit ; Sen Gupta, Sonali. / Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; 24).

Bibtex

@techreport{b88ce6224139445997b172b245ac6d4c,
title = "Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game",
abstract = "We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.",
keywords = "Abatement game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Efficiency gain",
author = "Herve Moulin and Indrajit Ray and {Sen Gupta}, Sonali",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
number = "24",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

AU - Moulin, Herve

AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

AB - We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash; however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.

KW - Abatement game

KW - Coarse correlated equilibrium

KW - Efficiency gain

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -