Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly ...
View graph of relations

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>05/2013
<mark>Journal</mark>International Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
Volume42
Number of pages22
Pages (from-to)541-562
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.