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Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment

Research output: Working paper

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Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment. / Georgalos, Konstantinos; Ray, Indrajit; Sen Gupta, Sonali.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Georgalos, K, Ray, I & Sen Gupta, S 2017 'Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment' Economics Working Paper Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Georgalos, K., Ray, I., & Sen Gupta, S. (2017). Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment. (Economics Working Paper Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Georgalos K, Ray I, Sen Gupta S. Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2017 Jan. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Georgalos, Konstantinos ; Ray, Indrajit ; Sen Gupta, Sonali. / Coarse correlation and coordination in a game : an experiment. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

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title = "Coarse correlation and coordination in a game: an experiment",
abstract = "In a coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978), each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to the future outcome from a probabilistic correlation device instead of playing any strategy of their own. In this paper, we consider a specific two-person game with unique pure Nash and correlated equilibrium and test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium with a devicewhich is an equally weighted lottery over three symmetric outcomes in the game including the Nash equilibrium, with higher expected payoff than the Nash payoff (as in Moulin and Vial 1978). We also test an individual choice between a lottery over the same payoffs with equal probabilities and the sure payoff as in the Nash equilibrium of the game. Subjects choose the individual lottery, however, they do not commit to the device in the game and instead coordinate to play the Nash equilibrium. We explain this behaviour as an equilibrium in the game.",
keywords = "Correlation, Coordination, Lottery",
author = "Konstantinos Georgalos and Indrajit Ray and {Sen Gupta}, Sonali",
year = "2017",
month = jan,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Coarse correlation and coordination in a game

T2 - an experiment

AU - Georgalos, Konstantinos

AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali

PY - 2017/1

Y1 - 2017/1

N2 - In a coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978), each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to the future outcome from a probabilistic correlation device instead of playing any strategy of their own. In this paper, we consider a specific two-person game with unique pure Nash and correlated equilibrium and test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium with a devicewhich is an equally weighted lottery over three symmetric outcomes in the game including the Nash equilibrium, with higher expected payoff than the Nash payoff (as in Moulin and Vial 1978). We also test an individual choice between a lottery over the same payoffs with equal probabilities and the sure payoff as in the Nash equilibrium of the game. Subjects choose the individual lottery, however, they do not commit to the device in the game and instead coordinate to play the Nash equilibrium. We explain this behaviour as an equilibrium in the game.

AB - In a coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978), each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to the future outcome from a probabilistic correlation device instead of playing any strategy of their own. In this paper, we consider a specific two-person game with unique pure Nash and correlated equilibrium and test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium with a devicewhich is an equally weighted lottery over three symmetric outcomes in the game including the Nash equilibrium, with higher expected payoff than the Nash payoff (as in Moulin and Vial 1978). We also test an individual choice between a lottery over the same payoffs with equal probabilities and the sure payoff as in the Nash equilibrium of the game. Subjects choose the individual lottery, however, they do not commit to the device in the game and instead coordinate to play the Nash equilibrium. We explain this behaviour as an equilibrium in the game.

KW - Correlation

KW - Coordination

KW - Lottery

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Coarse correlation and coordination in a game

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -