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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Community-level natural resource management institutions
T2 - A noncooperative equilibrium example
AU - Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva
PY - 2018/4/23
Y1 - 2018/4/23
N2 - The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.
AB - The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.
KW - noncooperative game theory
KW - correlated equilibrium
KW - natural resource management institutions
KW - governing the commons
KW - inshore artisanal fisheries
U2 - 10.18352/ijc.847
DO - 10.18352/ijc.847
M3 - Journal article
VL - 12
SP - 548
EP - 572
JO - International Journal of the Commons
JF - International Journal of the Commons
SN - 1875-0281
IS - 1
ER -