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Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example

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Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example. / Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva.
In: International Journal of the Commons, Vol. 12, No. 1, 23.04.2018, p. 548-572.

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Kaivanto KK. Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example. International Journal of the Commons. 2018 Apr 23;12(1):548-572. doi: 10.18352/ijc.847

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Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva. / Community-level natural resource management institutions : A noncooperative equilibrium example. In: International Journal of the Commons. 2018 ; Vol. 12, No. 1. pp. 548-572.

Bibtex

@article{bf9527bba83d4700b5e9a47cc438a888,
title = "Community-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example",
abstract = "The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.",
keywords = "noncooperative game theory, correlated equilibrium, natural resource management institutions, governing the commons, inshore artisanal fisheries",
author = "Kaivanto, {Kim Kaleva}",
year = "2018",
month = apr,
day = "23",
doi = "10.18352/ijc.847",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "548--572",
journal = "International Journal of the Commons",
issn = "1875-0281",
publisher = "International Association for the Study of the Commons",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Community-level natural resource management institutions

T2 - A noncooperative equilibrium example

AU - Kaivanto, Kim Kaleva

PY - 2018/4/23

Y1 - 2018/4/23

N2 - The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.

AB - The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) literature finds that Nash equilibrium predictions are empirically falsified in the social dilemmas that arise in community-level natural resource management problems. However, Nash equilibrium is not the only solution concept within noncooperative game theory. Here we demonstrate the power of Correlated Equilibrium (CE) to explain lotteries for the allocation of fishing sites as enduring community-level natural resource management institutions. Such CE-implementing lotteries are procedurally fair, equitable, and increase total expected fishery value.This modeling approach clarifies two further sets of relationships. It reveals the nature of the interdependence between the size and spacing of fishing sites and (a) the in-use characteristics of fishing gear, as well as (b) the degree of formalization of property rights and the structural features of the natural resource-management institution. When appropriately applied, noncooperative game theory offers a powerful explanatory complement to the IAD literature on community-level natural resource management.

KW - noncooperative game theory

KW - correlated equilibrium

KW - natural resource management institutions

KW - governing the commons

KW - inshore artisanal fisheries

U2 - 10.18352/ijc.847

DO - 10.18352/ijc.847

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 548

EP - 572

JO - International Journal of the Commons

JF - International Journal of the Commons

SN - 1875-0281

IS - 1

ER -