Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
AU - Shone, Robert
AU - Knight, Vincent
AU - Williams, Janet
PY - 2013/5/16
Y1 - 2013/5/16
N2 - We consider an M/M/1 queueing system in which the queue length may or may not be observable by a customer upon entering the system. The ‘‘observable’’ and ‘‘unobservable’’ models are compared with respect to system properties and performance measures under two different types of optimal customer behavior, which we refer to as ‘‘selfishly optimal’’ and ‘‘socially optimal’’. We consider average customer throughput rates and show that, under both types of optimal customer behavior, the equality of effective queue-joining rates between the observable and unobservable systems results in differences with respect to other performance measures such as mean busy periods and waiting times. We also show that the equality of selfishly optimal queue-joining rates between the two types of system precludes the equality of socially optimal joining rates, and vice versa.
AB - We consider an M/M/1 queueing system in which the queue length may or may not be observable by a customer upon entering the system. The ‘‘observable’’ and ‘‘unobservable’’ models are compared with respect to system properties and performance measures under two different types of optimal customer behavior, which we refer to as ‘‘selfishly optimal’’ and ‘‘socially optimal’’. We consider average customer throughput rates and show that, under both types of optimal customer behavior, the equality of effective queue-joining rates between the observable and unobservable systems results in differences with respect to other performance measures such as mean busy periods and waiting times. We also show that the equality of selfishly optimal queue-joining rates between the two types of system precludes the equality of socially optimal joining rates, and vice versa.
KW - Queueing; Customer information; Equilibrium strategies; Optimal strategies
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.12.016
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2012.12.016
M3 - Journal article
VL - 227
SP - 133
EP - 141
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
SN - 0377-2217
IS - 1
ER -