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Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. / Conyon, Martin; Peck, S; Sadler, G.
In: Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 1, 02.2009, p. 43-55.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M, Peck, S & Sadler, G 2009, 'Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom', Academy of Management Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 43-55. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002

APA

Conyon, M., Peck, S., & Sadler, G. (2009). Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. Academy of Management Perspectives, 23(1), 43-55. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002

Vancouver

Conyon M, Peck S, Sadler G. Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. Academy of Management Perspectives. 2009 Feb;23(1):43-55. doi: 10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Peck, S ; Sadler, G. / Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. In: Academy of Management Perspectives. 2009 ; Vol. 23, No. 1. pp. 43-55.

Bibtex

@article{1b65fc61f8324ecd86b7bdee6dda3bb4,
title = "Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom",
abstract = "Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.",
keywords = "EXECUTIVE compensation , BUSINESS consultants , CHIEF executive officers , EMPLOYEE fringe benefits",
author = "Martin Conyon and S Peck and G Sadler",
year = "2009",
month = feb,
doi = "10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
pages = "43--55",
journal = "Academy of Management Perspectives",
issn = "1558-9080",
publisher = "Academy of Management",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Peck, S

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2009/2

Y1 - 2009/2

N2 - Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.

AB - Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.

KW - EXECUTIVE compensation

KW - BUSINESS consultants

KW - CHIEF executive officers

KW - EMPLOYEE fringe benefits

U2 - 10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002

DO - 10.5465/AMP.2009.37008002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 23

SP - 43

EP - 55

JO - Academy of Management Perspectives

JF - Academy of Management Perspectives

SN - 1558-9080

IS - 1

ER -