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Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards

Research output: Working paper

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Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. / Klumpes, P J M.

Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Klumpes, PJM 1998 'Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards' Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series, The Department of Accounting and Finance, Lancaster University.

APA

Klumpes, P. J. M. (1998). Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series). The Department of Accounting and Finance.

Vancouver

Klumpes PJM. Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. Lancaster University: The Department of Accounting and Finance. 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Author

Klumpes, P J M. / Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. Lancaster University : The Department of Accounting and Finance, 1998. (Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{e6f746a23c4f47c285e2df72327f5c9f,
title = "Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards",
abstract = "This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities by testing the empirical implications of Becker''s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members (users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in 1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives (including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension plans.",
keywords = "Competition, pressure groups, pension plans.",
author = "Klumpes, {P J M}",
year = "1998",
language = "English",
series = "Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Accounting and Finance",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards

AU - Klumpes, P J M

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities by testing the empirical implications of Becker''s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members (users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in 1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives (including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension plans.

AB - This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities by testing the empirical implications of Becker''s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members (users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in 1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives (including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension plans.

KW - Competition

KW - pressure groups

KW - pension plans.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series

BT - Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards

PB - The Department of Accounting and Finance

CY - Lancaster University

ER -