TY - UNPB

T1 - Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards

AU - Klumpes, P J M

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities by testing the empirical implications of Becker''s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members (users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in 1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives (including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension plans.

AB - This paper integrates prior studies of accounting policy choice and lobbying activities by testing the empirical implications of Becker''s (1983) theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards. The theory is applied to explain the nature and outcome of conflict among pressure groups representing financial intermediaries (suppliers) and pension fund members (users) over the development of conflicting Australian pension accounting rules in 1991-92. Various pension fund financial characteristics and management incentives (including discretionary accounting policy choice and voluntary financial disclosures in pension plan financial reports) are posited to affect the pressure functions of each group. These functions combine to affect a political influence function that determines the rule development process. Consistent with the predicted relationships, it is found that supplier groups exert the most political pressure and secure political influence over the development of rules affecting defined benefit pension plans, whereas no group influences the development of rules affecting defined contribution pension plans.

KW - Competition

KW - pressure groups

KW - pension plans.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series

BT - Competition among pressure groups for political influence over the determination of accounting standards

PB - The Department of Accounting and Finance

CY - Lancaster University

ER -