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Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment

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Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment. / Dasgupta, Sudipto.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 31, No. 4, 11.1990, p. 841-865.

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Dasgupta S. Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment. International Economic Review. 1990 Nov;31(4):841-865.

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Dasgupta, Sudipto. / Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment. In: International Economic Review. 1990 ; Vol. 31, No. 4. pp. 841-865.

Bibtex

@article{fa70da7433434e52ac36c5193d4c6d50,
title = "Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment",
abstract = "A two-period model is considered in which ex ante identical firms invest inperiod one, and in period two, after they learn their costs, the lowest cost firmis chosen as the winner of the contract. It is found that even though firms areracing against one another, they end up underinvesting relative to the ex antesocially optimal levels when the buyer is unable to credibly precommit to thesecond period contract.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta",
year = "1990",
month = nov,
language = "English",
volume = "31",
pages = "841--865",
journal = "International Economic Review",
issn = "0020-6598",
publisher = "WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition for procurement contracts and underinvestment

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

PY - 1990/11

Y1 - 1990/11

N2 - A two-period model is considered in which ex ante identical firms invest inperiod one, and in period two, after they learn their costs, the lowest cost firmis chosen as the winner of the contract. It is found that even though firms areracing against one another, they end up underinvesting relative to the ex antesocially optimal levels when the buyer is unable to credibly precommit to thesecond period contract.

AB - A two-period model is considered in which ex ante identical firms invest inperiod one, and in period two, after they learn their costs, the lowest cost firmis chosen as the winner of the contract. It is found that even though firms areracing against one another, they end up underinvesting relative to the ex antesocially optimal levels when the buyer is unable to credibly precommit to thesecond period contract.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 31

SP - 841

EP - 865

JO - International Economic Review

JF - International Economic Review

SN - 0020-6598

IS - 4

ER -