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Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game

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Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. / Piazza, Jared; Bering, Jesse.
In: Evolution and Human Behavior, Vol. 29, No. 3, 05.2008, p. 172-178.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Piazza, J & Bering, J 2008, 'Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game', Evolution and Human Behavior, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 172-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

APA

Piazza, J., & Bering, J. (2008). Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29(3), 172-178. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

Vancouver

Piazza J, Bering J. Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. Evolution and Human Behavior. 2008 May;29(3):172-178. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

Author

Piazza, Jared ; Bering, Jesse. / Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game. In: Evolution and Human Behavior. 2008 ; Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 172-178.

Bibtex

@article{2b62995217e548e996ed9c58150a5ef7,
title = "Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game",
abstract = "In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information. Participants who received the threat of gossip manipulation were more generous than control participants, but only when the third party could personally identify them was this difference significant. These data reveal that at least some prosocial decisions are motivated by actor's reputational concerns—concerns that are directly mediated by language.",
keywords = "Gossip, Reputation, Generosity, Prosocial behavior, Language, Economic decisions",
author = "Jared Piazza and Jesse Bering",
year = "2008",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "172--178",
journal = "Evolution and Human Behavior",
issn = "1090-5138",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game

AU - Piazza, Jared

AU - Bering, Jesse

PY - 2008/5

Y1 - 2008/5

N2 - In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information. Participants who received the threat of gossip manipulation were more generous than control participants, but only when the third party could personally identify them was this difference significant. These data reveal that at least some prosocial decisions are motivated by actor's reputational concerns—concerns that are directly mediated by language.

AB - In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information. Participants who received the threat of gossip manipulation were more generous than control participants, but only when the third party could personally identify them was this difference significant. These data reveal that at least some prosocial decisions are motivated by actor's reputational concerns—concerns that are directly mediated by language.

KW - Gossip

KW - Reputation

KW - Generosity

KW - Prosocial behavior

KW - Language

KW - Economic decisions

U2 - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

DO - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 29

SP - 172

EP - 178

JO - Evolution and Human Behavior

JF - Evolution and Human Behavior

SN - 1090-5138

IS - 3

ER -