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Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections

Research output: Working paper

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Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. / Bracco, Emanuele; Revelli, Federico.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bracco, E & Revelli, F 2017 'Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections' Economics Working Paper Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Bracco, E., & Revelli, F. (2017). Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. (Economics Working Paper Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bracco E, Revelli F. Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2017 May. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Bracco, Emanuele ; Revelli, Federico. / Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2017. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

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title = "Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections",
abstract = "This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered government structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial electoral data from Italy during the 2000s. When the less-salient provincial elections are held concurrently with the highly salient municipal elections, we observe three main effects: (1) turnout increases significantly by almost ten percentage points; (2) issues that are specific of the more salient (mayoral) contest affect the less salient (provincial) contest, with mayors' fiscal decisions impacting on the vote share of provincial incumbents; (3) issues that are specific to the less salient (provincial) contest stopaffecting provincial elections outcomes. These findings shed light on how voters acquire information on incumbent politicians, and proves that the effectiveness of an election as an accountability tool may be hindered by the concurrence with higher-stakes elections. ",
keywords = "concurrent elections, turnout, political accountability, local elections, coat-tails",
author = "Emanuele Bracco and Federico Revelli",
year = "2017",
month = may,
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections

AU - Bracco, Emanuele

AU - Revelli, Federico

PY - 2017/5

Y1 - 2017/5

N2 - This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered government structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial electoral data from Italy during the 2000s. When the less-salient provincial elections are held concurrently with the highly salient municipal elections, we observe three main effects: (1) turnout increases significantly by almost ten percentage points; (2) issues that are specific of the more salient (mayoral) contest affect the less salient (provincial) contest, with mayors' fiscal decisions impacting on the vote share of provincial incumbents; (3) issues that are specific to the less salient (provincial) contest stopaffecting provincial elections outcomes. These findings shed light on how voters acquire information on incumbent politicians, and proves that the effectiveness of an election as an accountability tool may be hindered by the concurrence with higher-stakes elections.

AB - This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered government structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial electoral data from Italy during the 2000s. When the less-salient provincial elections are held concurrently with the highly salient municipal elections, we observe three main effects: (1) turnout increases significantly by almost ten percentage points; (2) issues that are specific of the more salient (mayoral) contest affect the less salient (provincial) contest, with mayors' fiscal decisions impacting on the vote share of provincial incumbents; (3) issues that are specific to the less salient (provincial) contest stopaffecting provincial elections outcomes. These findings shed light on how voters acquire information on incumbent politicians, and proves that the effectiveness of an election as an accountability tool may be hindered by the concurrence with higher-stakes elections.

KW - concurrent elections

KW - turnout

KW - political accountability

KW - local elections

KW - coat-tails

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -