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Constitutional implementation

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Constitutional implementation. / Peleg, B.; Winter, E.
In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 7, No. 2, 09.2002, p. 187-204.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Peleg, B & Winter, E 2002, 'Constitutional implementation', Review of Economic Design, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 187-204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200074

APA

Peleg, B., & Winter, E. (2002). Constitutional implementation. Review of Economic Design, 7(2), 187-204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200074

Vancouver

Peleg B, Winter E. Constitutional implementation. Review of Economic Design. 2002 Sept;7(2):187-204. doi: 10.1007/s100580200074

Author

Peleg, B. ; Winter, E. / Constitutional implementation. In: Review of Economic Design. 2002 ; Vol. 7, No. 2. pp. 187-204.

Bibtex

@article{3cf155de272446079dfa8d5a589693a4,
title = "Constitutional implementation",
abstract = "We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium when the constitution of the society is given by an effectivity function E. It is assumed that the effectivity function of H, E H, is a sub-correspondence of E. We found necessary and efficient conditions for a game form Γ to implement H (in Nash equilibria), and to satisfy, at the same time, that EΓ, the effectivity function of Γ, is a sub-correspondence of EH (which guarantees that Γ is compatible with E). We also find sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the set of winning coalitions of EΓ and E H, and for EΓ = EH. All our results are sharp as is shown by suitable examples. {\textcopyright} Springer-Verlag 2002.",
keywords = "Effectivity function, Implementation, Nash equilibrium",
author = "B. Peleg and E. Winter",
year = "2002",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s100580200074",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "187--204",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Constitutional implementation

AU - Peleg, B.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2002/9

Y1 - 2002/9

N2 - We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium when the constitution of the society is given by an effectivity function E. It is assumed that the effectivity function of H, E H, is a sub-correspondence of E. We found necessary and efficient conditions for a game form Γ to implement H (in Nash equilibria), and to satisfy, at the same time, that EΓ, the effectivity function of Γ, is a sub-correspondence of EH (which guarantees that Γ is compatible with E). We also find sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the set of winning coalitions of EΓ and E H, and for EΓ = EH. All our results are sharp as is shown by suitable examples. © Springer-Verlag 2002.

AB - We consider the problem of implementing a social choice correspondence H in Nash equilibrium when the constitution of the society is given by an effectivity function E. It is assumed that the effectivity function of H, E H, is a sub-correspondence of E. We found necessary and efficient conditions for a game form Γ to implement H (in Nash equilibria), and to satisfy, at the same time, that EΓ, the effectivity function of Γ, is a sub-correspondence of EH (which guarantees that Γ is compatible with E). We also find sufficient conditions for the coincidence of the set of winning coalitions of EΓ and E H, and for EΓ = EH. All our results are sharp as is shown by suitable examples. © Springer-Verlag 2002.

KW - Effectivity function

KW - Implementation

KW - Nash equilibrium

U2 - 10.1007/s100580200074

DO - 10.1007/s100580200074

M3 - Journal article

VL - 7

SP - 187

EP - 204

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 2

ER -