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Contests with a stochastic number of players

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Contests with a stochastic number of players. / Lim, Wooyoung ; Matros, Alexander.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 67, No. 2, 11.2009, p. 584-597.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

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Lim, W & Matros, A 2009, 'Contests with a stochastic number of players', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 67, no. 2, pp. 584-597. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012

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Lim, Wooyoung ; Matros, Alexander. / Contests with a stochastic number of players. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2009 ; Vol. 67, No. 2. pp. 584-597.

Bibtex

@article{ecddca3645004c96b2cc73729f910dee,
title = "Contests with a stochastic number of players",
abstract = "We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.",
keywords = "Contests, Stochastic number of players , Over-dissipation",
author = "Wooyoung Lim and Alexander Matros",
year = "2009",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012",
language = "English",
volume = "67",
pages = "584--597",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "ELSEVIER ACADEMIC PRESS INC",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contests with a stochastic number of players

AU - Lim, Wooyoung

AU - Matros, Alexander

PY - 2009/11

Y1 - 2009/11

N2 - We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.

AB - We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.

KW - Contests

KW - Stochastic number of players

KW - Over-dissipation

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012

M3 - Journal article

VL - 67

SP - 584

EP - 597

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 2

ER -