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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Contests with a stochastic number of players
AU - Lim, Wooyoung
AU - Matros, Alexander
PY - 2009/11
Y1 - 2009/11
N2 - We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.
AB - We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We also demonstrate that ex-post over-dissipation is a feature of the pure-strategy equilibrium in our model. It turns out that if the contest designer can strategically decide whether to reveal the actual number of participating players or not, then the actual number of participants is always revealed.
KW - Contests
KW - Stochastic number of players
KW - Over-dissipation
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.012
M3 - Journal article
VL - 67
SP - 584
EP - 597
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -