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Contracting with heterogeneous externalities

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Contracting with heterogeneous externalities. / Bernstein, S.; Winter, E.
In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, p. 50-76.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bernstein, S & Winter, E 2012, 'Contracting with heterogeneous externalities', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 50-76. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.50

APA

Bernstein, S., & Winter, E. (2012). Contracting with heterogeneous externalities. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(2), 50-76. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.4.2.50

Vancouver

Bernstein S, Winter E. Contracting with heterogeneous externalities. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2012;4(2):50-76. doi: 10.1257/mic.4.2.50

Author

Bernstein, S. ; Winter, E. / Contracting with heterogeneous externalities. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2012 ; Vol. 4, No. 2. pp. 50-76.

Bibtex

@article{e0b3a50f2114403c90b22133a7ade583,
title = "Contracting with heterogeneous externalities",
abstract = "We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry. (JEL D62, D82, D86).",
author = "S. Bernstein and E. Winter",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1257/mic.4.2.50",
language = "English",
volume = "4",
pages = "50--76",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Contracting with heterogeneous externalities

AU - Bernstein, S.

AU - Winter, E.

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry. (JEL D62, D82, D86).

AB - We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry. (JEL D62, D82, D86).

U2 - 10.1257/mic.4.2.50

DO - 10.1257/mic.4.2.50

M3 - Journal article

VL - 4

SP - 50

EP - 76

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 2

ER -